

The Post-2015 Agenda: Sustainable Development Goals Will Only Work if They Learn from the MDGs

Abstract

This paper reviews the successes and failures of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and attempts to apply these lessons to Post-2015 frameworks, particularly the proposed Sustainable Development Goals that emerged from the Rio+20 process. Using the UN's publicly reported data for each MDG indicator over the entire reporting period, and comparing these to Millennium Campaign Annual Reports (which display inconsistently aggregated data) we show that although the reported data is largely accurate, some interpretations of it are not entirely representative, which could lead to misinterpretation or misidentification of priorities. The paper goes on to argue that although clear achievements have been made by the MDGs such as on reducing extreme poverty, increasing access to clean water, primary education and infectious diseases, these should not obscure significant structural weaknesses, including a failure to account for economic change, the development of persistently-underdeveloped nations (the 'Bottom Billion'), or to effectively incorporate environmental protection and sustainability within development frameworks. The paper concludes by arguing that for the SDGs to succeed they need to learn the *political* lessons of the MDGs and not just fill in the gaps or become captive to the 'special pleading' of single-interest lobbies. The SDGs offer a chance for a new political bargain to be made between a rich world aiming for sustainability and a poor world aiming for growth.

One Thousand and Ninety-Five Days

On January 1st 2013, 192 nations and several dozen multilateral institutions (not to mention seven billion people) will be three years from a deadline pledging themselves to, among others, halve extreme poverty and hunger, reduce infant mortality by two-thirds, halt HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, and ensure environmental sustainability across the world. This paper looks at the results of the Millennium Development Goals, the data and the politics behind these, and asks how the experience of formulating and implementing these Goals can be used in planning what comes next.

First, the good news. To the end of 2011, the UN Millennium Campaign (the international body set up to cheer-lead for the MDGs) reports that¹:

- i. Extreme poverty (those living on less than \$1.25 every day) is falling in every region of the world, and is not just limited to emerging powers such as China or India.
- ii. The overall target of halving extreme poverty globally has been met three years before the MDG deadline.
- iii. The overall target of halving the number of people without access to clean water has been met three years before the MDG deadline.
- iv. Improvements have been made in the lives of slum dwellers, specifically by decreasing their numbers even as urban populations have risen.
- v. Parity has been achieved in primary education between boys and girls, largely as a result of efforts to achieve Universal Primary Education (UPE)
- vi. Although UPE has had a positive impact in terms of supporting parity between girls and boys, it has only had limited success in achieving primary education for all children of primary school age

¹ The Millennium Development Goals Report 2012; pp.6

- vii. Under-5's mortality rates are improving, largely due to vaccination campaigns and primary healthcare strengthening
- viii. Access to HIV treatment has increased, partly as a legacy of the 3By 5 Campaign, and global funding such as from the American President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Gates Foundation and the Global Fund
- ix. Tuberculosis rates are likely to peak by 2015, despite the twin set-backs of HIV/TB co-infection and Multiple and Extensively-Drug Resistant TB (MDR/XDR-TB)
- x. Malaria rates are starting to drop, although as we will see later any decline in malaria is still within the global margin of error, with surveillance regimes and Artemisinin-resistance proving to be large challenges over the next few years.

These are significant achievements, and although we will get to areas where the MDGs have not substantially altered development trajectories, they represent lasting change and mark the MDGs out as targets that have not only worked but have worked globally, no mean feat in the history of development objective-setting.

Success in the MDGs had four aspects, according to a study commissioned by the London International Development Centre of nineteen separate sectoral experts² and published in the *Lancet* (2010). First, having been formed out of the Millennium Summit of 2000 the MDGs rode a wave of, and adroitly encouraged, political buy-in from just about every member of the United Nations in either conception or implementation (189 out of 192 member states). Furthermore, 118 nations have reported at some point using the principles of the Goals to set objectives or measure development progress.

Second, the MDGs have provided a focus for advocacy work, first in the campaign to have the Goals adopted, then in the way that they can be simply communicated and understood, and also in the campaign to actually meet them undertaken by the Millennium Campaign and the global coalition of civil society, government and business under the Global Call to Action on Poverty banner.

Third, they have improved the targeting and flow of aid to specific objectives. Between 2000 and 2006 aid for health under regimes such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations (GAVI), PEPFAR and the Global Fund, grew from \$6.8bn to \$16.7bn, effectively changing the debate from raising money to how best to spend it. Similar progress has been made in education and food systems. It is not a coincidence that over the same period proportions of direct budgetary support to developing nations have declined as donors have taken a more coordinated and hands-on approach to development.

Lastly, the MDGs have created an important legacy in the collection of data for development, and in demonstrating the importance of surveillance (particularly in areas such as health and the environment) in order to meet development objectives. While the *quality* of data produced for the MDGs may have not kept pace with the general *quantity*, it has nonetheless established the general principle that measuring progress is both possible and necessary.

Criticism of the Goals largely breaks down into six areas.

Development Architecture: While the Goals may have had a role in increasing overall development performance, a number of critics including Jan Vandemoortele³ (one of the original proposers of the Goals) note that they have had less impact on the international development system and upon the structure of aid. Manning (2010)⁴ argues that while the MDGs are very visible and often cited, the evidence that they have substantially altered policy, rather than being co-opted when particular donors align with a specific Goal or Goals, is lacking. Manning notes that although they are enthusiastically referenced by Europeans (and the EU), few instances can be found of policy changes contingent on the Goals, or new policy based solely on advancing the Goals. Japan is almost silent on the Goals, and China (as both a donor and developing nation) supports the MDGs at local level for itself, but rarely makes them a condition of the aid it disburses to others. Additionally, the United States did not formally endorse the Goals until 2005 as part

²Waage et al (2010), pp.5

³See Vandemoortele (2012a) and Vandemoortele (2012b)

⁴Manning (2010) pp.8

of a post-Iraq policy shift towards greater multilateralism and a strengthened development strategy generally (a process that also put \$15bn into HIV/AIDS through PEPFAR).

Development Planning: Whilst the MDG process has been successful in selling the Goals and in communicating their benefits to both publics and policy-makers (for which much of the credit should be given to the Millennium Campaign) the real test for the international community is whether the Goals have contributed to the development they claim, or if they have merely been witnesses to it. Fakuda-Parr (2010)⁵ tested whether rhetoric translated topolicy change by analysing 22 recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) submitted by national governments to the IMF and World Bank as part of loan agreements, and 21 Development Cooperation Statements of bilateral aid programmes. She finds that whilst there is a high level of stated support for the MDGs, they often only have an effect on policy where the interests of the donor and recipient align with a particular Goal or set of Goals. As she says “The key issue is not whether there is ownership of MDGs as such but how this is interpreted, which of the MDG priorities are being implemented, and what policy strategies are being adopted”⁶

Exclusions: A number of issues were excluded from the MDGs. Climate change, while referenced, is widely criticised for not being a separate Goal by environmental activists. The UNDP criticises the Goals for focusing on the social aspects of development at the expense of the economic and environmental, especially in terms of equity⁷, and much of the NGO community explicitly criticises the failure to advocate for or make any commitments on social protection.⁸On the environment, the lack of a specific large goal to rally behind, again like climate change, rather than an overarching goal on environmental sustainability with many unrelated, and weakly specified, indicators meant that progress was weak. The lack of a vocal constituency (as HIV/AIDS had) may be to blame here. Human Rights and good governance are often cited as the main oversights of the MDGs, with critics focusing on human rights approaches to development effectively strengthening voices of the poor, and their ability to act as a ‘narrative thread’ joining-up otherwise disjointed Goals. A final glaring oversight was on states in crisis, those nations that show up consistently in the lowest ranks of both the Human Development Index and the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index, usually in Sub-Saharan Africa and South-West Asia. Paul Collier calls these states ‘The Bottom Billion’, for whom development outcomes are very slow, or where improvements in standards of living accrue disproportionately to elites.⁹ They include those countries blighted by conflict, such as Afghanistan or the DRC, for which there is growing evidence from some such as Joanna Macrae¹⁰ that not only is aid to these nations not lifting people out of poverty, but it may indirectly subsidise conflict; as well as resource-rich nations such as Nigeria that consistently fail to distribute resources equitably enough to produce broad-based growth, despite not being ‘failed states’ in the classical sense.

Inequality: The MDGs do not contain a reference to either economic or social inequalities, although elements of these are touched on in Target 1:B Full and Productive Work for All, Target 8:A Develop an Open, Rule-Based and Non-Discriminatory Trade System and Target 8:D Make Debt Sustainable. This is surprising, as the Millennium Declaration not only explicitly mentions equality (Clause 6) but also solidarity and social justice.¹¹ The lack of an explicit mention of inequality is probably an indication of the political difference between what can be passed as a non-binding resolution in the General Assembly, and what can be incorporated as concrete commitments at multilateral level. It is notable that those working on post-2015 frameworks still focus on equality as an openly acknowledged oversight that the MDGs made. The focus on equality (or as some would have it equity¹²) is necessary, as Vandemoortele argues, to counter the false notion that *national* reporting of MDGs accurately shows inequalities between countries (the data is actually not sufficient to be useful in this regard at all), when it is the data on inequalities *within* countries that contain the real information on whether the MDGs are having an effect. As many Pan-Africanists have been at pains to point out, there are more poor people in India than in Africa, but as India is only one

⁵Fakuda-Parr (2010)

⁶Ibid pp.33

⁷UN System Task-Team on the Post-2015 Agenda (2012); pp.4

⁸See for example ActionAid (2012); pp.4

⁹Collier (2008)

¹⁰Macrae (2001); see especially chapter four on the functions of aid in Cambodia, Ethiopia and Uganda

¹¹United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000)

¹²See Vandemoortele’s points on this distinction (2012b); pp.6

country and there are 54 members of the African Union, presenting national data may lead one to conclude that most of the poverty and deprivation in the world is concentrated south of the Sahara.

Change: It would be unfair to criticise the Goals for failing to predict events such as the War on Terror or the financial crisis of 2007-09, but a lack of foresight on issues such as security and the management of international finance have quickly dated the Goals and raise questions about the continuing relevance of results-based development. An inability to properly account for change not only takes hostages to fortune (and in this respect they have been fairly lucky, coinciding with ten years of relatively universal economic growth, transfers of wealth due to rising commodity prices and, despite the war on terror, years of relative peace in places like Africa and the Balkans) but can also confuse macro-level trends with micro-level details. For example, the ‘headline news’ of the MDGs, an overall decline in absolute poverty, can be accounted for by the vast numbers of Chinese now living on more than \$1.25 a day and an overall decline in hunger accounted for by vast numbers of Indians who no longer count as food insecure. The hundreds of millions of improved lives in these two countries are however balanced out by more modest gains, and even some reverses, in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Asia-Pacific region and the Caribbean.

Inter-Relationships: The MDGs can be described as a high-water mark of a ‘Newtonian’ system of international relations, of ordered hierarchies and unipolar power (in the West, if not the United States alone) where actions have predictable consequences.¹³ A world characterised, in Fukuyama’s much misunderstood phrase, by the ‘End of History’¹⁴. The return of history, in the form of 9/11, the global financial crisis and the rise of the BRIC nations, represent a system that is more analogous to quantum mechanics. Power is exercised in a multi-polar fashion, and is not governed by one set of mechanical rules, but instead is dependent on who it is being exercised by, and upon whom. As such, cross-cutting issues and the inter-relationships between them are more important than single-issues that are defined and dealt with in discrete silos. These cross-cutting issues include, but are not limited to: endemic conflict and the complex relationship with extreme poverty; gender and more explicitly women’s issues; human rights, in an analytic as well as a practical sense; and the complex inter-relationship between inequality and overall development. Whilst touting the success of the Goals overall, it is quite difficult to find countries that have demonstrably and unambiguously benefitted from them. The typical country that has performed well has been a country, troubled in the past, but that is now ambitious to grow an economy from a low base. Uganda, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Cambodia fit the bill; but they are outliers. Any country that has done well under the MDGs seems to have already been on the right track by 2000, few countries that have done better after 2000 seem to be due to the MDGs, and several (such as Nigeria) that have mixed records regarding development don’t seem to have been affected either way. Interestingly, Leo and Barmeier (2010)¹⁵ report little correlation between MDG success and economic performance (measured by both income per capita, growth and aid receipts), but some limited correlation between strength of institutions and MDG success. As successful institutions take years to establish and become effective, this suggests that any developmental success in the 2000’s is more attributable to action taken before 2000 than after.

Sprint to the Finish: The Results of the Millennium Development Goals

Goals are set as *global* targets but are implemented, and importantly monitored, *nationally*. This means that in presenting the results of the MDGs it is easy and tempting to fudge the data. For example, if a target is only somewhat on track, it is possible to report on star performers and claim large successes for a Goal. Additionally, as each Goal is made up of several Targets, and each of these is made up of several Indicators (which are sometimes proxies), it is possible to focus on one good Indicator (or one bad one) and conflate this result with progress towards the whole Goal.

The Millennium Campaign publishes annual reports that provide aggregated results for each Goal (but not always for each Target and Indicator). But the Campaign is not responsible for, nor owns, the datasets and it does not make the data it uses public. This is not to specifically criticise the Campaign, it does not have resources for data collection nor an extensive secretariat, and it has to placate 17 Specialised Agencies of

¹³ Galtung and Scott expand on this metaphor in their analysis of the post-Cold War international system in *Democracy – Peace – Development* (2008)

¹⁴ Fukuyama (1993)

¹⁵ Leo and Barmeier (2010)

the UN and 192 National Committees. As useful and robust as the Campaign's reports are, we cannot know how comprehensive they are without seeing the original datasets that they use or the full methodology behind how they aggregate data. Additionally, Annual Reports place emphasis on presentational issues, and are naturally limited by both format and space.

As such, the results of the Goals vary slightly depending on who is presenting them and whether they are using information from the Campaign or they are measuring progress independently with their own data. Results are also variously reported without separating or specifying Goals, Targets and Indicators, and often it is not possible to 'reverse-engineer' any assumptions made in this regard when attempting to understand the data.

Most troubling is that the information supplied by the Millennium Campaign itself does not aggregate data globally, despite the whole point of the Goals being that they are *global* targets, and it is instead disaggregated by region.¹⁶ Whilst this is somewhat contingent on UN structures (various Economic Commissions operate regionally), and presenting data consistently by region may be correct politically, statistically it is quite arbitrary. Presenting results from East Asia back-to-back with results from Oceania creates the visual but quite wrong impression that both carry equal weight, when the population of the former is ten times that of the latter.

In order to present as complete and accurate a picture as possible, this paper presents the best available data on each of the MDG Goals, Targets and Indicators. Following the Campaign's lead, we reproduce their data for each Target and Indicator, disaggregated by region, and present this back-to-back with our estimate of the *aggregated* result based on the best available source and where possible the official UN body most closely associated with, or responsible for, the specific Indicator, including the UN's dedicated MDG Indicators dataset (although it should be emphasised that no one dataset provides full, aggregated data for all Indicators). We then list the source used and provide a link to that source.

Methodology

1. Data has been given in its reported aggregated total where this has been available. Where not, it has had to be analysed in disaggregated datasets, with global figures estimated using the 'Average' function on MS Excel.
2. Annual progress reports from the Millennium Campaign have been consulted for this paper. However, as the Campaign does not publish the full data sets in these reports, we have attempted not to use specific data related to aggregate outcomes directly from these reports in an attempt to compare like for like.
3. The data-sets used are fully referenced in the results. These include two primary sources, the MDG Indicator set published on DevInfo by the United Nations Development Group, and the World Bank eAtlas of the Millennium Development Goals. Both of these provide data-sets that can be manipulated to give data broken down by country, region, country groupings, theme and whole world. Neither database contains comprehensive, aggregated data for all MDG Indicators. As a rule, DevInfo was consulted first, the World Bank second, and other databases third if neither of these produced sufficient data.
4. Secondary sources include the United Nations Statistics Division, WHO, UNCTAD, UNAIDS, OECD and the UN MDG-Gaps Taskforce.
5. This dataset reports on each of the Goals, Targets and Indicators that the MDGs will be assessed on in 2015. It was important to do this, and not just to copy the last report from the Millennium Campaign, as data is not always recorded in the same way and so there is a danger of not reporting like-for-like. For example, and for obvious reasons of space, Campaign reports sometimes report on progress towards a whole Goal in one report, and then break this down by selected indicators in another; or report comprehensively on a case study of their work on several indicators in a particular country, or across a specific theme. Only by reporting Indicator by Indicator measured by the most appropriate source can a comprehensive picture be shown.

¹⁶Vandemoortele, one of the principle architects of the Goals has spent much of his career since making this point in order to combat the misreading and misuse of MDG results.

6. Despite being *global* targets, and data being collected by *national* committees, the Campaign reports *regionally* by means of a traffic-light system of ‘green’ for target on-track, ‘orange’ for not on track, and ‘red’ for severely off-track, and is not specific about the boundaries between these categories. Additionally, the campaign only reports on an annual basis on general progress towards each Goal. For this report we have used the Campaign’s methodology at face-value, aggregated globally, for each indicator. As such, our best interpretation of each global indicator based on the traffic-light system, and using the reported data itself, is shown along-side the regionally disaggregated colour awarded for each target. Further complicating the matter is that in a few instances the Millennium Campaign does disaggregate by indicator, and these are shown too.
7. Because each region contains different development challenges, and different populations, these assessments need to be considered together in order to fully appreciate their context. For example, Target 1.C, halve the number of people who suffer from hunger, shows little or no progress according to our assessment of the global target. However, disaggregation by region shows many areas of the world making at least some progress on this target.
8. A Target is only coloured green if it has been met or will be met by 2015, based on the precise wording of the Target. A Target is coloured orange if substantial improvements have been made, but probably not enough to reach the target by 2015. ‘Substantial improvement’ is of course a subjective measure, usually defined by an interpretation of any narrative statement accompanying the indicator from the Millennium Campaign or the organisation publishing the relevant database. A Target is coloured red if it is likely to be missed, and any improvements are not significant enough to demonstrate that the MDGs have made a substantial global difference.
9. Data is collected on non-OECD countries, even though the targets are explicitly global, although confusingly, on some indicators data is collected globally¹⁷ (including importantly on some Goal 7 environmental targets such as carbon emissions), and on some databases (ie the World Bank) the OECD is even listed as a category you can refine data by. But these were explicitly *global* targets, and the effort to meet them has *global* effects. It is difficult to know how SDGs constructed as direct facsimiles of MDGs would reconcile this key difference of development goals measuring progress on development outcomes partly or wholly in developing countries while SDGs, almost by definition would need to be constructed as global targets, and would have to bridge the developed/developing economy divide. As such, all the data used either shows the global situation or the studies’ own aggregation of national and occasionally regional data.

Results and Implications for the SDGs

Goal 1 Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger

- i. **Target 1A Extreme Poverty.** This target has largely been met, and is perhaps the ‘headline news’ of the Goals. However, most progress has occurred in East and South East Asia, with lesser success in Africa and South Asia. There are no direct analogues in the Rio+20 Communique.
- ii. **Target 1B Full and Productive Employment.** This target is not sufficiently measured. The Campaign reports that many regions have made some progress, but not enough to reach the target. Our research suggests that there is not sufficient data to aggregate for growth per person employed or employed persons living in poverty. Rio+20 indicates a focus on technological innovation.
- iii. **Target 1C People Living in Hunger.** Campaign reporting shows a mixed-bag on this Target, but our judgement is that it is off-track, with number of people living below the dietary minimum too high to bring down the hunger rate, and a lack of data available for under-5s nutrition. A lot of potential successors emerge from Rio+20 including focuses on food systems, agricultural research and implementation of existing accords.

Goal 2 Achieve Universal Primary Education

- i. **Target 2A Universal Primary Education for Both Girls and Boys.** Universal Primary Education is off-track, but some progress has been made, especially in Africa. This Goal is seen as especially cross-sectional, as UPE often means action on gender as many more girls are missing out on primary school than boys, and increased educational attainment is often

¹⁷UN Task-Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, May 2012pp.5

correlated with improved health indicators, especially for maternal and child health. A commitment to the right to education remained in Rio+20, but it was disappointing that no explicit indicators were suggested.

Goal 3 Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women

- i. **Target 3A Eliminate Gender Disparity in Education.** The main indicator, gender ratios, has been met but the knock-on effects of gender equality have yet to filter through to the labour market, which is off-target, or to national parliaments which have insufficient data (although the Millennium Campaign's data shows this as off-track.) The nearest potential successor Target is to implement the programme of the International Conference on Population and Development.

Goal 4 Reduce Child Mortality

- i. **Target 4A Reduce by 2/3 the Under-5 Mortality Rate.** Under-5 mortality has had good progress, largely due to horizontal primary care strengthening, but infant mortality (under-1) is off-target which correlates with poor progress on Goal 5. Significantly, the progress has been slowest in Africa and South Asia. Disappointingly, no explicit commitments on Child Mortality came out of the Rio+20 document.

Goal 5 Improve Maternal Health

- i. **Target 5A Reduce by 3/4 the Maternal Mortality Ratio.** The maternal mortality target has been missed in every region except East Asia and the Caucasus, and progress has been off-target on the proportion of births attended by skilled personnel. This target shows a discrepancy between the published information, which shows some improvement, and our assessment which is that this has not been substantial enough to come close to a 75% reduction to support this claim. A roughly similar indicator was proposed by Rio+20.
- ii. **Target 5B Universal Access to Reproductive Health.** The data show no improvement on either the contraceptive prevalence rate or the adolescent birth rate and is not sufficient on antenatal coverage or family planning. Only East Asia seems to meet this target. There were no explicit commitment proposed by Rio+20.

Goal 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases

- i. **Target 6A Halt and Reverse Spread of HIV/AIDS.** The important indicator of reducing 15-24 prevalence has been achieved, and this is a significant achievement for the Goals; however data is insufficiently aggregated on condom use and on prevention knowledge, which are critical components of this. Neither is there sufficient data on school-attendance among AIDS-orphan, although UNAIDS, who collect very robust data, report good progress in this regard. Good commitments came out of Rio+20 including expanding this Goal to include other communicable diseases, and reform of global trading regimes for drugs.
- ii. **Target 6B Universal Access to Treatment.** This has not been met, but progress has been substantial from a low base. Importantly, progress has been good in Africa where 80% of need is. However, there is some uncertainty as to what 'advanced infections' refers to which impairs the consistency of the data. The Rio+20 commitments are the same as for Target 6A.
- iii. **Target 6C Reverse Malaria and Other Diseases.** This Target just scrapes a pass, with a 3% fall in malaria rates, but inadequate data on under-5s sleeping under nets and receiving drugs. There has been insufficient progress in Africa, where the majority of *P.falciparum* infections (the most dangerous) occur, with other regions performing far better. It should also be noted that environmental change, Artemisinin-resistance, and poor surveillance mean that any gains on malaria are fragile. Tuberculosis targets are comprehensively missed, and again inappropriately disaggregating by region does not account for the fact that the majority of cases occur in Sub-Saharan Africa, and so meeting the target has not been much of a challenge for many regions of the world.

Goal 7 Ensure Environmental Sustainability

- i. **Target 7A Sustainable Development and Reverse Resource Loss.** Poor data and slow progress characterise this Target, with insufficient aggregation of information on CO₂ emissions, ozone-depleting substances, and water-stock management. Rio+20 has, understandably, a number of proposed successors including strengthening existing protocols,

- giving further powers to the UNEP, better reporting on biodiversity loss, particularly in the oceans, and action on desertification.
- ii. **Target 7B Reduce Biodiversity Loss.** The number of protected areas shows some improvement, but species threatened with extinction shows little progress at all. See 7A for Rio+20 suggestions.
 - iii. **Target 7C Halve the Proportion Without Access to Safe Water and Sanitation.** The water half of this target has been met but the sanitation half hasn't, which is surprising given the complex interrelationship between these. Again, good suggestions came out of Rio+20 including a human right to clean water, better management of water stocks and ecosystems, and tackling water pollution.
 - iv. **Target 7D Significant Improvement in the Lives of 100m Slum Dwellers.** This has been the unambiguous success of the environmental targets, potentially doubling the number of beneficiaries expected to 200m. However, the indicator could potentially be criticised for only measuring the numbers living in slums, rather any qualitative improvement. There is no follow-up in Rio+20, which is surprising given the increasing prominence given to urban issues in development.

Goal 8 Develop and Global Partnership for Development

- i. **Target 8A Develop Open, Rule-Based, Predictable and Non-Discriminatory Trade.** This is off-target, although with only one indicator (net ODA) it can hardly be said to encompass the wide aims of the Target. The ODA commitment of 0.7% GDP is rolled over to Rio+20, continuing a 60 year old aspiration.
- ii. **Target 8B Address the Special Needs of Least Developed Countries (LDC).** This Target has been comprehensively missed as measured by proportion of ODA going to basic social services, assistance to landlocked LDCs, and assistance to small-island LDCs. Some progress has been made on untied aid, but not enough to meet the target. Good successor indicators are proposed including UN reform and better risk reduction strategies.
- iii. **Target 8C Special Needs of Landlocked and Small Island LDCs.** This Target has also been substantially missed for the special categories of landlocked and remote island states, principally in North Africa and Central Asia (landlocked) and the Pacific and Caribbean (small island), although again 'special needs' is only assessed as economic and measured by ODA. Good successor targets came out of Rio+20 following high-level international fora on LDCs.
- iv. **Target 8D Deal with Debt Problems of Developing Countries.** This Target is imprecise, given it has seven separate indicators and two sub-sections (market access and debt sustainability). This surfeit of information cannot hide the fact that only one indicator (debt servicing as a percentage of exports) is not off-track or entirely missed. Trade barrier and HIPC-completion (Highly Indebted Poor Nation status granted to certain nations to structure their debts) Indicators are especially disappointing given the amount of attention on these issues over recent years. There are no real follow-ups in Rio+20.
- v. **Target 8E Provide access to Affordable Drugs.** This is the only Target for which there is no data, as only one indicator is available and this does not provide suitable aggregate data. The Millennium Campaign doesn't provide data in this detail either; although the UN MDG Gap Taskforce claims a public sector percentage of 42% and a private sector percentage of 64% without detailing their methodology.
- vi. **Target 8F Make Available the Benefits of New Technologies** This Target demonstrates that the Goals were a product of their time! The number of fixed telephone lines indicator has been missed but has largely been superseded, especially in Africa, by the mobile connections and internet access indicators, both of which substantially exceed the target.

The Good, the Bad and the Unknown

The MDGs, unlike some development indicators that came before them, have produced a number of quantifiable and unequivocal improvements in the lives of the poor. Given the inauspicious history of implementing objectives such as those set out in the Brundtland Commission, or the OECD commitment of 0.7% of national income to aid, the MDGs stand out for their quantifiable achievements and, just as importantly, for avoiding obscurity.

A comprehensive picture of all that is good (or bad) with the MDGs is potentially unlimited, so this section will focus on a few case studies for each. As well as focusing on what has worked and what hasn't, it will also examine what was missed or obscured by the MDGs, and ask what can be done to provide a comprehensive new framework for development without giving in to either special pleading or to the temptation of making the Goals so broad that they lose their focus.

The Good

The headline news of the Goals has been progress on both poverty and hunger, priorities that were so great that they were incorporated right at the start of the MDGs as Goal 1. The overall progress on this Goal even seems to have weathered what the Millennium Campaign calls 'the multiple crises of 2008/09' related to the global financial crisis and the Great Recession in Europe and the United States¹⁸, although the same report cautions to expect increasing food insecurity in the final years of the MDGs due to delayed effects on global supply chains. Drops in absolute poverty have been bolstered by the emerging powers – with one study estimating that 60% of those taken out of extreme poverty are Chinese¹⁹ – but it is worth remembering that the MDGs don't actually specify where beneficiaries should live, and progress on extreme poverty has been recorded in each region except Oceania.

As detailed elsewhere, whilst progress on hunger has been difficult to quantify (the Millennium Campaign claims success whereas our analysis is cautious) globally the poverty Target is on track to be met, with all three indicators (proportion living below \$1/day [now \$1.25]; poverty gap ratio; and consumption of poorest quintile) being on-track to being met by 2015. Poverty and hunger are complexly inter-related, which is why they share a Goal, and so making progress on poverty is likely to be a sign that food security has improved too. Given the criticism levelled at the MDGs for not explicitly addressing inequality, it is worth pointing out that two out of the three poverty indicators do indirectly measure it.

Progress on poverty, and perhaps on hunger, poses a couple of problems for the Sustainable Development Goals and for development activism generally. First, management of poverty and hunger (or, as some environmentalists might have it, effectively postponing problems) becomes a victim of its own success and the political urgency to tackle the problem or a willingness to try new things weakens. In Franklin Roosevelt's famous phrase: 'I agree with you. I want to do it. Now make me do it.' In democratic systems, about which the MDGs have little to say, and for that matter in undemocratic systems too, things don't get done without political pressure. The danger of MDG1, and of all the MDGs in fact, is that a few years of progress may lead to the mistaken conclusion that the problem has gone away.

Secondly, the perennial elephant in the corner of reducing poverty is that countries that have successfully set up development trajectories to take themselves out of the late-developing stage and into middle-income status have invariably focused on *unsustainable* growth.²⁰ This is growth which is unsustainable in both senses; not only is the pace of growth not indefinite, but it invariably crowds out voices that call for protection of the environment, better living conditions for the weakest, or the responsible stewardship of natural resources. Furthermore, as Ha-Joon Chang²¹ shows, countries going through rapid development transitions are rarely good international citizens, characterised instead by infant industry protection and tariff-led export strategies that usually hurt their (poor) neighbours more than the rich countries that they are attempting to gain a competitive advantage over. This hardly bodes well for sustainable (and fair) development.

Some good progress has been made on education, particularly through the adoption of Universal Primary Education policies, which is not only a simple and uncomplicated aim with an accessible logic to it, but as noted elsewhere, has the added benefit of improving the position of girls and women by locking a gender balance into primary education that remains through secondary and tertiary education, and results in more positive gender balance in general society. Education seems to be as close to a 'magic bullet' as it is

¹⁸ UN Millennium Development Goals Report, 2012; pp.7

¹⁹ Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs, 2012; pp.17

²⁰ See cf. Stiglitz 2002, Moyo 2009, Easterley 2001

²¹ Chang 2002

possible to get, with associated benefits in healthcare, particularly in infant mortality, delayed aged of motherhood, and success in primary healthcare strategies such as vaccination campaigns.²²

With these successes come some caveats. The Millennium Campaign reports that whilst progress has been fair on education, much of the gains were achieved in the early 2000's, suggesting that they built on achievements in the 1990s or earlier, before the Goals were agreed.²³ The recent appointment of Gordon Brown as Special Envoy for Global Education may be an attempt to address the lack of focus on education; and it is notable that where task-oriented, specific, well-funded UN bodies operate (like UNAIDS) progress on those development issues has been good, whereas a lack of focus on education corresponds with limited progress on this Goal (UNESCO is more of a cooperative body than an programme).

From the start, health was central to the Goals, and the Campaign has been keen to demonstrate consistent successes in improving health and social wellbeing. Health is spread over Goals 4 (child mortality), 5 (maternal health) and 6 (HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases) and its dominance of the MDGs demonstrates the way in which results-based frameworks seem to be a good 'fit' for healthcare, because things can be measured well (although results-based frameworks are, of course, not the same as actual results.) International health has a coherent and well-funded constituency, not necessarily united but used to mobilising resources and people to action²⁴, and this is attributed by some such as Vandemoortele²⁵ to the dominance of health in the MDGs.

HIV/AIDS in particular rode the 'perfect storm' of a massive crisis coming to a head as international politics aligned in just a way as to focus attention (and more importantly money) on the issue. Peter Piot details the frantic scramble in the UN system to do something about AIDS and set up the Global Fund in 2002, and it was only the objections of the WHO that saw tuberculosis and malaria added to what was otherwise likely to be a vertical silo of funding for HIV/AIDS alone.²⁶

One specific lesson that ambitious constituencies looking to affect future development frameworks can take from the experience of HIV/AIDS was the early realisation that it was as much a political task as a humanitarian one. Again HIV/AIDS benefitted from fortunate timing by appearing in the West in the 1980s just as homosexuality was decriminalised and the feminist movement began to successfully put issues of gender, sexuality and health on the public agenda. The emergence of AIDS met newly empowered political constituencies, and was promptly and effectively dealt with. As HIV/AIDS became a massive developmental crisis in Africa a decade later, a ready-made lobby of empowered and energised activists kept the issue alive in Washington, London and Paris.²⁷ The visibility of HIV/AIDS was so high, and the campaign so politically effective, that in 2000 HIV/AIDS (and specifically the threat to peacekeeping operations worldwide) became the first major health crisis to be debated by the UN Security Council.²⁸

Our analysis shows that: i. HIV-prevalence rates in adults have fallen; ii. there is not sufficient *aggregated* data to assess progress on condom-use nor on knowledge among young people; iii. access to education for AIDS orphans has risen (but the data is disaggregated); iv. access to drugs is off-target, but progress has been made; v. incidence of malaria is just about falling (from a very high level); vi. data on children having access to bed-nets and malarial drugs is insufficient; vii. incidence, prevalence and deaths from TB have made some but not enough progress; and viii, the global adoption of the DOTS treatment

²² See, for example Paul Farmer's work in Haiti in *Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights and the New War on the Poor* (2004) and *AIDS and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame* (2006)

²³ The UN Millennium Development Goals Report 2012; pp.17

²⁴ Peter Piot, the founding director of UNAIDS, details extensively in his memoirs (2012) how the political fight to establish UNAIDS against the opposition of the WHO prepared him and the organisation for the bruising, but largely successful, fights for funding and action on AIDS.

²⁵ Vandemoortele (2012a)

²⁶ Piot (2012)

²⁷ See Baldwin's *Disease and Democracy* (2007) for a full account of the political impact of the AIDS epidemic in the West

²⁸ "Security Council, Adopting 'Historic' Resolution 1308 (2000) on HIV/AIDS, Calls for Pre-Deployment Testing, Counselling for Peacekeeping Personnel": United Nations Press Release SC/6890 17/07/2000, accessed at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000717.sc6890.doc.html>

regime for TB has failed completely. If it is hard to keep tally of all those results they work out as two definite successes, four partial successes, three unknowns, and one definite failure. Solid progress given the scale of the task, but perhaps not the unambiguous victory sometimes portrayed. The MDGs clearly did coincide with progress on HIV/AIDS, but the extent to which the relationship is causal is debatable. The peaking and slow fall of HIV-incidence, and a delayed but similar pattern of HIV-prevalence (made even slower by the success of drug-therapy) have corresponded exactly to Barnett and Whiteside's²⁹ epidemic curves that suggest that HIV rates will not fall beyond a certain point, may rise again thereafter, and are less sensitive to technical interventions than to the epidemiological cycle.

The Bad

Health, and its effect on development, is so extensive an issue that we may as well stay on it in order to discuss what was bad about the MDGs. The most obvious failing of the health Goals is their acceptance of a public health orthodoxy that certain problems (especially disease prevention) should be vertically 'siloe'd' into discrete units, rather than tackled in a horizontal, or cross-cutting way, through approaches such as public health surveillance or health systems strengthening as recommended in 2001 (perhaps just too late) by the Commission on Macro-Economics and Health.³⁰

This sort of approach, which has gained greater traction in recent years, runs up against political obstacles in the shape of a pharmaceutical and healthcare industry that likes problems with neat solutions like vaccines or pills rather more than increased spending on doctors, nurses and hospitals; and an international development and donor community that likes to be able to report to its constituents that it is curing sick people rather than paying salaries or building things. Infrastructure for health is now coming back into vogue, not least because of the money poured into it by China and the emerging donors, and so a shift from single-issue disease programmes to health-systems strengthening in post-2015 frameworks is highly probable. Funding health systems, rather than specific sectors of healthcare, provides an opening for the environmental and SDG lobbies, focusing more on a capabilities approach to development, which stresses the need to focus on the micro-level empowerment of individuals to make independent choices, rather than the macro-level focus on getting the structures right.³¹

This 'silo' effect on health has led to some glaring omissions and mis-prioritisation, which became obvious almost from the start. HIV/AIDS only counts as the fifth highest cause of morbidity in the world with 58.5m DALYs lost³², whereas lower respiratory infections account for 94.5m DALYs lost, diarrhoeal diseases count for 72.8m lost, depressive diseases count for 65.5m DALYs lost, and heart disease for 62.2m DALYs lost. TB and malaria score even lower on the list, at places 11 and 12 respectively, below road traffic accidents.

The most obvious failure of global health priorities has been in the sums of money that have gone to HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria, but that are conspicuously lacking for diseases such as schistosomiasis, trypanomiasis and onchocerciasis, the leading causes of the top two disease burdens, respiratory infections and diarrhoeal diseases. This is not to mention the prevalence of non-communicable diseases, or 'rich-world' diseases that are nothing of the sort, they are just in the background and are often overlooked because they are not 'diseases of poverty'. It is hard not to escape the conclusion that the mobilising and energising power of naming certain diseases plays a role here. Would it be as easy to raise money for

²⁹ Barnett and Whiteside 2006; pp.43-47

³⁰ WHO Commission on Macro-Economics and Health (2001) : Accessed at: <http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story008/en/index.html>

³¹ See Amartya Sen 2001

³² DALY = Disability Adjusted Life Year. One DALY is the equivalent of one year of productive life lost for an adult. So, one day's sickness for an individual counts as 1/365th of a DALY. These figures are taken from the WHO Global Burden of Disease 2004 (Update 2008) accessed at: http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/2004_report_update/en/index.html

generalised immuno-suppressive disorder³³, or syndromic mycobacterial infections³⁴, or febrile proctitis³⁵?

As ever, chronic poverty is most endemic in Sub-Saharan Africa, and whilst cheerleaders for the MDGs will point that the greatest improvements in development have occurred in African nations over the past decade it is still the case that the most significant concentrations of poverty are found in Africa, and the greatest improvements in the standard of living have been largely due to economic growth rather than organised development planning. Even after a decade of widespread growth, and largely avoiding the economic crises in Europe, North America and East Asia that have further narrowed the gap between the richest and poorest, Sub-Saharan Africa still retains 50% of global extreme poverty, with only 15% of the global population. Africa's hunger rate has actually risen by 10% over the last decade, and a murky picture of the future exists with the potential of booming agribusiness on one hand, and low productivity (and massive environmental challenges) on the other.³⁶

The state and its role in the development challenge is a particularly acute issue for much of the continent. Governance has improved significantly over the last decade, but this has been from a low base, and is still very much a 'work in progress'. Whereas by the end of the 1970s very few African states would have been described as free or democratic, Freedom House describes 29 out of 50 states to be Free or Partly Free in 2012.³⁷ It is this category of 'Partly Free' that is key. Because so many African states moved from authoritarian, military or kleptocratic rule during the 1990s and 2000s, there is a danger of mistaking some progress with full progress and for allowing an Afro-pessimism to take over that assumes partial freedom in Africa is as good as it will get. The recent history of donor nations embracing 'reformers', only to later denounce their slide to authoritarianism or election rigging, such as in Uganda, Rwanda or Ethiopia, demonstrates this well. Twenty-Nine states being Free or Partially Free is good, but only six of them count as unambiguously free as it would be recognised in Europe or America.

Is governance missing from the MDG framework? In an empirical sense it clearly is; no substantive Goal is devoted to it, democracy is not mentioned, neither is human rights, and no mechanism for implementing the Goals is favoured above others, clearly indicating that governance is an issue left to member states. This is all the more surprising as the Millennium Declaration covers governance extensively in sections 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8,³⁸ including a whole section on promoting the special needs of Africa. This should caution post-2015 development framers therefore, being a very strong indication that politically sensitive issues are readily dropped from negotiated agreements such as the MDGs.

But governance is critical to post-2015 frameworks, and to the Sustainable Development Goals in particular. The SDGs after all call for closing development gaps between rich and poor nations, decreasing inequality within nations, rejecting GDP as the only measure of economic progress, devolving more economic power to the UN, and intervention in industrial and agricultural markets to promote sustainable growth and prevent inequality. Only a framework that puts governance in a central position could hope to balance the competing demands of poor nations that fear they have left it too late to develop, and those of rich nations who fear it may be at their expense.

Africa has experienced rapid growth in recent years, but the change has often been quantitative, not qualitative. UNCTAD reports that significant dangers remain for Africa, and specifically for its long-term ability to maintain the growth rates necessary to close the economic and income gap:

- i. Economic growth in Africa is driven by non-renewable resources, and these will not last forever, nor are they being managed particularly well. National governments are not reaping the full benefits of this growth as commodity prices are so volatile it depresses the investment

³³ HIV

³⁴ Tuberculosis

³⁵ Malaria

³⁶ The Millennium Development Goals Report 2012: pp.12

³⁷ 'Sub-Saharan Africa': Freedom House; accessed at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/regions/sub-saharan-africa>

³⁸ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2 Session 55 'United Nations Millennium Declaration': 2000

- market more substantially than growth rates would suggest, and prevents broader-based growth.
- ii. Agricultural output and productivity have not made great progress and have not kept up with growth, demonstrating a failure to reinvest productivity gains in either technological innovation or human resources. Substantial threats of food insecurity remain, and are not just limited to poor agricultural areas. Any expansion of output has been a result of new land farmed, rather than productivity gains.
 - iii. Africa is actually deindustrialising, not industrialising. Manufacturing fell from 15% of GDP to 10% 1990-2008, as a result of a commodities boom orienting economies to export raw materials rather than finished goods. Economic consensus is that high-growth economies that break out of poverty (such as in East Asia and Latin America) are led by manufacturing, and this is not happening in Africa due to a lack of skilled workers and unfavourable export regimes.
 - iv. High urban growth rates, without a commensurate expansion of manufacturing, create a limited urban service-based economy, but return little capital back to the agricultural sector to keep the economic cycle going. This in turn keeps the economy food-insecure, and a manufacturing boom in agricultural goods, to kick-start a wider urban manufacturing boom, is stifled.³⁹

So we do not fall into the trap of Afro-pessimism ourselves, let's end by saying what is positive about Africa, and would bode well for the continent under a new SDG development framework. While reports of a green revolution for Africa are often been talked about, and often failed to materialise, signs of agricultural change are starting to appear and as more stable and prosperous markets in Africa emerge, and as the cost of growing food in Europe continues to rise, at some point Africa will reach a tipping point and become a net-exporter rather than net-importer of food. The idea that Africa cannot feed itself is increasingly disproven, and it could become some of the most productive land available. In 2005 Malawi ignored World Bank advice and subsidised nitrogen-based fertilizer for tobacco farmers. Within one season, Malawi went from being a net-agricultural importer to a net exporter, and the World Bank changed their policy on such techniques in other countries.⁴⁰ Ever-growing food prices may mean Africa will start to make huge productivity gains as fertilisation and other modern techniques become affordable and Africa becomes attractive for agribusiness, assuming that global production of nitrates keeps pace or suitable substitutes are developed. Ethiopia, once synonymous with food-insecurity, is now a net-exporter of food, and generates a significant portion of its foreign reserves this way; and emerging 'bread-baskets' (or banana-baskets, or rice-baskets) such as the Lake Victoria basin, Zambia-Malawi, the Egyptian Nile corridor, and the coffee and cocoa belt of West Africa are well placed to provide abundant, sustainable agricultural land.

Agriculture is only one area where Africa retains some environmental advantages. 41% of the world's cobalt, 56% of the diamonds, 34% of the gold, 53% of phosphate rock and 15% of uranium are found in Africa. As much as there is a 'resource curse', there are plenty of examples where resources have helped countries grow: diamonds in Botswana, gold and platinum in South Africa, coffee and cocoa in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, agribusiness in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.⁴¹

There is no escaping the fact that the MDGs have not reproduced the same successes in the environmental sphere as it has in the social and economic. As well as missing many targets, many indicators fail to be properly assessed as sufficient aggregated data is not available, suggesting that either the environment has not been a high enough priority for the MDGs, or that the targets set were just unrealistic. Data is missing on CO₂ emissions, ozone-depleting substances and water resources, and is largely not aggregated, or data that is aggregated is not consistent in its aggregation. Targets are being missed on deforestation, fish stocks, extinction rates, protected areas and sanitation. Only drinking water and slum-dweller targets are being met.

³⁹ UNCTAD 2012; pp.21

⁴⁰ 'Africa, an agricultural powerhouse?': Michael Moran; GlobalPost 30/09/2012 accessed at: <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/120926/malawi-africa-agriculture-food-security-world-bank>

⁴¹ UNCTAD 2012; pp.46

Lots of successor targets and indicators were suggested by Rio+20, so it is to be hoped that the most positive result will be a greater urgency to formulate Sustainable Development Goals.

The UNDP's plan for a post-2015 framework acknowledges the general failure to take robust action on the environment in the twenty years since Rio, particularly in the MDGs. "Today's world risks exceeding the limits of the earth's capacity in several critical dimensions. Greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), biodiversity loss and ocean acidification are reaching alarming levels. These, together with decreasing availability of fresh water, land degradation and deforestation are undermining the livelihoods of many people, especially those living in absolute poverty. When the natural resource base is destroyed, sustaining economic and social development becomes increasingly difficult and inter-generational equity is compromised."⁴² It is this critical link between environmental sustainability and sustaining economic and social development that needs to be at the heart of Post-2015 frameworks and to this we should add, as some activists argue, equitable access to energy in order to head off any potential energy-shocks of the future.⁴³

The Unknown

This section looks at what was left out of the MDGs, the processes that led to them being left out or overlooked, and asks whether scope-limited goals can ever be truly independent of the political interests that frame them.

No international framework can keep every constituency happy. Such agreements exist within the body of loosely-related agreements, regulations, protocols, alliances, and treaties that is often mislabelled as the international 'system'. International frameworks trade in the currency of consent, principally of state actors, but also increasingly of non-state actors, multilateral bodies and individuals too. Consent is not the same thing as power; two of the most powerful international bodies are the G20 and the OECD, economic groupings that are deliberately exclusionary and that set very high barriers to membership. The International Convention on the Rights of the Child is the most ratified human rights instrument in history (192 signatories), but given the status of child rights around the world is arguably one of the least successful.⁴⁴

The Dutch Advisory Council on International Relations highlight eight themes that are not adequately addressed in the MDGs⁴⁵:

- i. Sustainability, growth and employment, by which they mean one combined theme (each of these is considered separately in the MDGs);
- ii. Inequality, both within and between countries, and taking a multi-faceted view of inequality;
- iii. Knowledge and technology, and how these can be incentivised to drive change;
- iv. Demography and population health generally;
- v. Security of both the individual and of the state and international system;
- vi. Infrastructure strengthening to support growth in Africa;
- vii. Human rights and good governance, and the links between these and development;
- viii. Global public goods, and stewardship of these;

In addition to these, they judge a further four themes to have lacked sufficient detail to be effective, despite being included in the MDGs:

- ix. Food security, and the health of food systems;
- x. Climate change and managing this to meet development objectives;
- xi. Gender, and any real strategy for a global framework on this;
- xii. Global governance, particularly the systems that guide international relations, rather than just the individual structures.

⁴²UN System Task-Team on the Post-2015 Agenda: pp.3

⁴³ActionAid 2012:pp.4

⁴⁴Unicef: 'Convention on the Rights of the Child Frequently Asked Questions' accessed at: http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229.html

⁴⁵Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs, 2012; pp.27

Lists of items left out of the MDGs could go on forever, and there is a grave danger that any post-2015 framework may become unwieldy or watered down due to special pleading. Having said that, we would like to add to the list the further neglected issues of disability, which is not really addressed explicitly in the goals, nor in the loose human rights framework governing it; regional cooperation, which only really exists in some delegated responsibilities for the goals, a legacy continued in the Rio+20 outcome document; and governance emphasising democracy and pluralism, rather than just the efficiency of systems.

This raises an important structural question for the post-2015 framework: should new goals focus on entirely new issues, or should they address the gaps that remain within existing priorities? One of the clear successes of the Goals has been in reducing extreme poverty even if it has been less successful in reducing inequality. Does this mean, therefore, that the remaining half of extreme poverty shouldn't now be eradicated? And even if it was decided that extreme poverty wasn't a continuing priority, how do we know that removing attention from it won't prevent those gains over the last 15 years being reversed? Finally, do we know that eradicating the next half of extreme poverty can be achieved in the same way as the first, or has success been built on plucking only the low-hanging fruit?

Let's take a closer look at some of the important things left out of the MDGs and consider their relevance for post-2015 frameworks. One criticism of the MDGs is that they focus on agency, things like diseases that make you sick, at the expense of structure, the actual mechanics of society and the contribution of these to underdevelopment. Accepting this premise is to be cautious, if not outright sceptical, about the entire project of framing development into a set of amalgamated and reductionist targets, as countries have had very different experiences in meeting the MDGs, with both political agency (such as visionary and charismatic leaders) and political structure (such as the stability necessary to set and achieve targets) playing roles in this process.

The most visible structural challenge is political stability, and perhaps the most telling statistic of all to come out of the MDGs is that not a single nation that has been described as 'fragile' at some point since 2000 has met one of the MDGs.⁴⁶ As has become increasingly clear in the years since 2000, catalysed by the war on terror and the invasion of Afghanistan, is that in addition to nations in 'Extreme Poverty' (a large proportion of people living on less than \$1.25 a day, and without a sustained economic trajectory of growth sufficient to break out of this category in the near-future) there is a special sub-group of nations that always score incredibly poorly on development indicators and are unlikely to change in the short-term due to a complex of political violence, low development, and environmental or geographical challenges. These nations have been named, variously, as 'failed states', 'collapsed states', 'states in crisis' and 'complex political emergencies'.⁴⁷

The problem with fragile states is that they are both predictable and unpredictable. They are predictable because some states never seem to escape 'fragile' status. Zaire (now DR Congo) collapsed into kleptocracy almost as soon as the Belgians left in 1960, and it has only a few 'bright' years since under Patrice Lumumba and occasionally under Laurent Kabila and his son Joseph during lulls in what has been called the Second Congo War. DR Congo has been ravaged by under-development, the political difficulty of ruling a country the size of the European Union, and foreign interference involving (at one time) eight neighbouring countries.

⁴⁶UN System Task-Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda; pp.18. An exception to this rule may be Sierra Leone, which collapsed into gangland-warfare before democracy was restored by a UN/British mission in 2000. Goal 3 (primary education gender disparities) nearly meets the target; and Goal 4 (childhood mortality) has made significant progress; but all other Goals are off-target. However, the fact that Sierra Leone's war just ended as the MDGs began and it has been, politically, an unusually successful post-conflict LDC due to intensive donor involvement (helped not least by the end of the regional war in the Greater Mano River-Basin due to the end of the Charles Taylor regime and a return to democracy in Liberia in 2006) it is marked out, unfortunately, as the exception that seems to prove the rule. <http://www.sl.undp.org/mdgsl.htm>

⁴⁷ For these purposes, 'fragile states' refers to those 12 nations rated by the Fund for Peace as 'fragile' and 19 nations as 'partly fragile', as well as two states (Somalia and DR Congo) assessed as 'failed states'. 21 of these 33 states are in Africa. <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2012>

But fragile states are also unpredictable. Fragility has nothing to do with how democratic or liberal a government is. In fact some of the strongest states have been the least democratic or liberal, just like North Korea today, or China and the Soviet Union in the three decades following the Second World War. Iraq now ranks as 'fragile', but would have previously been counted as a strong, police, state. Currently, Libya and Syria are going through transitions from strong and undemocratic to weak and democratic. Fragility has little short-term effect on development; the real persistent underdevelopment of DR Congo, or Afghanistan, or in Haiti which seems unlucky both environmentally and politically, or in Chad which has few resources and is in a bad neighbourhood, marks these countries out from those that are politically fragile but retain robust economies and societies such as Iran or Pakistan.

Inequality is the next 'gap' in the MDGs, and if fragile states seem like a politically difficult issue to address, then inequality is fraught with danger. It is here, perhaps, that we need to be most cautious about what is politically possible, and an unthinking proposal (in reality or in perception) to forcibly redistribute wealth not only misjudges potential political opposition, but fails to learn the political lessons of how the MDGs came to enjoy so much support. The Millennium Declaration contained clauses addressing 'equality', 'solidarity' and 'shared responsibility', none of which had anything more than rhetorical impact on the actual Millennium Development Goals. Activists seeking more equitable development frameworks need to consider not only the rich countries, who will balk at language that is anything other than raising the poor up rather than pulling the rich down, but also the poor countries who may consider equality to be code for banning those practices (such as industry-protection, tariff-support and export subsidies) which made rich countries rich in the first place, and look to be the only real competitive advantage they have in a world of dwindling primary resources. Much better to start with reform of systems, principally global trade, that allow poor countries to make large gains while the burden pushed back onto rich countries is minimised. Collier⁴⁸ lists coffee, cotton and bananas as three export crops where breaking down tariff barriers (particularly cross-border barriers between poor nations), reinvesting tariff revenues into primary manufacturing, and even subsidising imports as part of a development package, are well-placed to mutually benefit both exporting and importing nations. A number of minerals have been identified as good candidates for commodity-based export growth too.

ActionAid calls for the inclusion of a 'social floor' in post-2015 frameworks, a minimum standard above which every citizen should be expected to live.⁴⁹ It is a bold idea, and it fits naturally into the idea that such frameworks should start from a position of human rights and work out. But it doesn't seem to fit particularly well with a capabilities approach (giving people tools, rather than setting a minimum guaranteed income), nor does it seem politically sophisticated given the new framework will need to be agreed at a time when donor economies are still fragile, and developing economies are emphasising growth. ActionAid's solution to this dilemma is to focus on arranging financial transfer compacts whereby untied aid flows to countries that make effective efforts to raise their own tax bases through legal and economic reform. Those most in need (like those coming out of conflict or facing environmental challenges) would still receive emergency aid, but long-term untied aid in the form of budgetary support would only be forthcoming if commensurate efforts to raise the tax base were made first.⁵⁰

Perhaps sensing the difficult terrain in which equality operates, many focus instead on equity. Vandemoortele⁵¹ has a suggestion for addressing the problem of getting all poor countries to converge on the same goals when some are clearly poorer than others, and when global targets are met largely by those countries that have least to do performing well, by 'weighting' the system so that attention (and money) can focus on where it is needed, and also on providing the greatest returns on investment. He looks at the performance of MDG nations towards the Under-5 Mortality Rate, and suggests that (adjusted for population) those nations that have least equity (ie more development still to do) have a 'weighted' advantage if they decrease the rate at the same pace as those that have most equity, as the figure shows:

Scenario	Using un-adjusted weights	Using equity-adjusted
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⁴⁸ See Paul Collier, 2008

⁴⁹ ActionAid, 2012: pp.7

⁵⁰ See Putzel and DiJohn's work on the contribution of industrial policy to the political economy of states emerging from crisis: www.crisisstates.com

⁵¹ Vandemoortele 2012b: pp.6-9

		weights
Low-equity	70	83
Medium-equity	70	75
High-equity	70	70

If the target is for a nation to gain an increase of 100 points on a hypothetical indicator, and both low-equity and high-equity nations achieve a seventy-point increase, the high-equity nation scores only a 70, whereas the low-equity nation scores an 83 to reflect its more impressive achievement. The further distribution of aid resources and investment can then be determined on such an equity-based formula.

A final suggestion for post-2015 frameworks⁵² may be to focus instead on wellbeing, a much broader measure of progress that might have a better chance of building political consensus than the potentially polarising inequality. This accords neatly with much of the capabilities literature that again stresses empowering individuals through increased skills, opportunity and importantly political and social freedom, rather than trying to use development policy as social engineering, and resonates with recent calls for more social and economic freedoms in return for development support, such as Ha-Joon Chang's⁵³ work on economic nationalism, and Dambisa Moyo's⁵⁴ call for recipients who are not in the fragile state category to wean themselves off aid over a period of ten to fifteen years..

Lessons from the MDGs for the SDGs

What are the overall lessons from the MDGs for the post-2015 process, therefore? In this section we will focus on process more than on the failures or successes of specific targets or indicators as putting together a structure for a decade, or potentially decades, of development policy can only really hope to provide an enabling environment for development rather than to predict the details of it. Five over-arching lessons stand out:

Think About the Structure

Given that a theme of this paper has been on the balance between details and flexibility, getting the structure of the SDGs right is critical. Development frameworks at this level are not just technical exercises, their structure has political consequences, and any proposed successor to the MDGs has to not only be structured so that productive development targets can be pursued, but also so that it can tread the fraught political path to implementation. Arguably, the MDGs did not apply this lesson well enough. The Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs criticise the MDGs for a lack of intellectual coherence or a "...vision of a development process that requires structural change. Despite the fact that the MDGs were never intended as a one-size-fits-all approach, many – especially in the donor community – have embraced them as a mantra for development, sometimes through lack of a better alternative."⁵⁵

A lack of vision is hurtful in two ways. Not only is there the danger that a lack of clarity in setting goals will lead to imprecision in the targets selected and on qualitative improvement in human development, but an unintended consequence of imprecise goals is that consensus replaces evidence, and the authority that official indicators have (especially after a successful MDG process) could obscure the fact that they neither promote development adequately, nor measure it particularly well. Vandemoortele labels this 'misplaced concreteness', the tendency to assume that all data is equally robust and that uncertainties or aggregations can be compared with precise data without comment.⁵⁶

Here are the key structural criteria for Post-2015 agenda-setting that emerge from the literature:

⁵² Netherlands Advisory Council on International Relations: 2012; pp.52

⁵³ Chang (2002)

⁵⁴ Moyo (2008)

⁵⁵ Netherlands Advisory Council on International Relations, 2012: pp.40

⁵⁶ Vandemoortele 2012b: pp.3

- A limited set of discreet and universal goals and specific, measurable indicators that don't give in to special pleading but remain short and focused (UN System Task-Team on Post-2015 Agenda, Center for Global Development, Vandemoortele/UN)
- A focus for national priority-setting to rally around that is universal and adaptable and gets the politics right (UN System Task-Team on Post-2015 Agenda, Vandemoortele/UN)
- A transparent process that balances effective action with simplicity and accessibility, particularly addressing the combining of health indicators (UN System Task-Team on Post-2015 Agenda, Beyond 2015, Vandemoortele/UN)
- A focus on human, rather than explicitly economic, development particularly through a human rights approach (UN System Task-Team on Post-2015 Agenda)
- An emphasis on outcomes of the Goals rather than outputs (Center for Global Development)
- Address the issue of equality, or at least equity, while maintaining support of all member-states, both rich and poor (Beyond 2015, Center for Global Development)
- New targets will only work if they are not imposed from the top-down. It must be the result of consensus, and not imposed from the North (Beyond 2015)
- Targets must focus on 'horizontal' issues that cross boundaries, as much as on 'vertical' issues that address single problems without considering their embedded systems (Center for Global Development)
- Fifteen years seems just about right as a time frame for Goals; with twenty-five years as a maximum for a looser framework. Five year review points seem to be working as well (Vandemoortele/UN)
- The MDGs benefitted from broad-based growth among donor countries during the first half of the Goals (2001-2008), and generally consistent growth in recipient nations through the whole period. A new plan is needed for difficult, and divergent, economic times (Beyond 2015)

Think about the South

The process leading up to the MDGs was a long and convoluted one, but resulted in a set of Goals that drew on a loose process of international goal-setting that ran throughout the 1990s.⁵⁷ The process coincided with a decade of broad-based economic progress in many of the world's regions, the presence of one single hegemonic superpower without a close competitor, and the end of division and strategic contest in Europe that had largely set the meta-narrative for development in the rest of the world for half a century.

What is past is prologue. What has sometimes been termed 'the long 1990s' (from the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 to September 11, 2001) is now seen, romanticised even, as a period of growth, stability and peace in the rich world, and a largely ignored but occasionally troubled (*cf* Rwanda, Somalia) poor world. Twelve years on, after a War on Terror, a global financial depression, the Arab Spring, and the relentless rise of the BRICS, this can look like naïve idealism, what one critic calls the high point of a 'dependency model' of development⁵⁸, where prescriptive norms of development are imposed in a top-down fashion, and inclusion means devolving the grubby business of implementation to poor countries themselves. This thinking was by no means confined to the MDGs. The Global Fund is based in Geneva and disburses funds donated by rich nations; the Gates Foundation and PEPFAR are American initiatives in the field of health; the Blair Commission for Africa (remember that?) incorporated several African panel

⁵⁷ Hulme 2007

⁵⁸ Moyo 2008

members with several European, but launched its report in London, mainly to a white audience of British NGOs.

Activists complain that the MDGs reflect donor values (it was also a pretty consistent complaint of pre-MDGs frameworks too), and that replacements should be focused more on the south. Donor values have been reflected in the focus on metrics, although the frustrations of the MDGs-backers are understandable given that the whole point of the Goals was to demonstrate progress rather than just to set targets. Too much emphasis on donor priorities, and on measuring things, can crowd out beneficiaries, a situation made all the more perplexing by a pretty consistent chorus of support in rich countries for democracy, pluralism and participation in poor countries.

Perhaps those keen to promote sustainable development, but who are also keen on democracy, should be careful what they wish for. One of the few continent-wide public opinion surveys in Africa, Afrobarometer⁵⁹, shows pretty consistently that what publics across the continent want is growth and jobs. Given six choices, an overwhelming 59% say that the major task of government is to improve the economic conditions of the poor. Unemployment is rated as the most important issue by 13% of people, poverty by 9%, infrastructure by 8% and economic problems by a further 8%. Outside of the economy and employment, food and farming scores 13%, health 9% and education 6%. Neither the environment nor sustainability (nor foreign aid) score the 1% necessary to be listed in the data.

How development frameworks are structured determines their legacy, both good and bad. In order to say a brief word in support of the Goals, they are realist, or at least more realist than what came before. Waage et al⁶⁰ point out that MDG success is built upon a switch from a 'maximalist' approach to development to a 'minimalist' approach, emphasising minimal thresholds of progress under a globalised development framework. Gone are the ambitious but unspecific calls for justice; but so too, perhaps, is the excitement and charisma. A generalised neo-liberalism won out over Post-Colonialism, the Non-Aligned Movement, Pan-Africanism or any other maximalist idea.

Perhaps the ultimate triumph of a minimalist framework will be the Post-2015 process, which will see an unusually weak 'rich' world and an unusually strong 'poor' world. Here, the process will be defined by an OECD that is cutting back on development assistance and a newly emerging world who see it as a critical strategic imperative. However, the infrastructure-led model of development promoted by China, India, Brazil and others does create a very different world to that of the OECD-consensus. While ActionAid bemoan the lack of transparency in development, they note the political opportunity to recruit donors investing in infrastructure to a new cause, raising the tax base of poor countries themselves by whole-scale tax reform and graft-prevention in return for infrastructural support and access to markets. ActionAid shows that the tax base is perhaps the most under-exploited means of increasing development assistance and preventing that perennial enemy of development, capital flight. Tax regimes in the developing world typically account for 10-15% of GDP compared to 35-45% in the OECD, so there is significant slack that can be taken up. ActionAid report on a scheme in Rwanda diverting direct budget support from DFID to investment in revenue-collecting capacity; the scheme returned a surplus to the Rwandan treasury in just four weeks.⁶¹

Think About How to Communicate Them

The MDGs show that not only do targets need to be good, but they need to be sold well. The MDGs have a mixed record in this regard. Simple, accessible and comprehensible Goals were effective at personal, national and global levels. But the Goals also suffer from a strategic, and fundamental, communications problem. Individual countries are often praised for exceeding targets or chastised for missing them, when the whole point is that they are *aggregate* Goals, and what matters is the global picture, with country-level indicators only serving to show general progress over time and to mobilise domestic stakeholders.

⁵⁹ Little and Logan 2009: pp.19

⁶⁰ Waage et al 2010: pp.4

⁶¹ ActionAid 2012: pp.8

As such, an extremely poor country such as Chad, under-developed with environmental challenges and political insecurity, can be mistakenly categorised as under-performing despite never having been reasonably expected to meet the test of ‘average’ development assumed by the Goals. Chad’s test instead is whether it makes *some* improvement towards the MDG benchmarks. At the other end of the development scale, Brazil exceeds progress on many indicators, yet the MDGs frameworks have nothing to say about how much an emerging-superpower and rapidly developing middle-income country should be expected to exceed the Goals. What a large portion of MDG critics forget is that they are minimum goals for some, and wild ambitions for others. This is why they only make sense in aggregate.

Even the Millennium Campaign is guilty of blurring the lines between targets and aspirations. For example, in the 2011 report on MDG progress it is reported that the East Asian region has outperformed target growth, when it is China that has exceeded the target and other countries have a more mixed record. At the other end of the scale, African MDG performance is muted somewhat by relative under-performance of large ‘laggards’ such as Nigeria, Sudan and the DR Congo.⁶² Elsewhere in the same report is a separate obfuscation, the comparison of data that is clearly not like-for-like. Data is often ‘over-produced’ or ‘under-produced’. Over-produced data is too voluminous to mean much except to experts and ‘gatekeepers’ such as the World Bank are needed to honestly communicate this data. Under-produced data is that which is partially missing, or patchy, or that tries to project data where there are gaps without consistent or open methodologies. The difficulty in being able to tell where each problem arises (or even sometimes tell them apart) means that the basic MDG progress data is almost inaccessible to the lay man or woman.

A further communication failure lies in the very basic understanding of who is responsible for the Goals, from where authority derives, and who answers when things go wrong. The Millennium Declaration and subsequent MDG-related instruments of the United Nations contain no expropriation powers, nor any specific commitments of funding. The Millennium Campaign itself has no funds for programmes, it exists to ‘cheer-lead’ for the Goals, and to coordinate individual countries who have devolved responsibility for implementation. As such, a number of critics point out that the MDGs place all the burdens on developing countries with no guidance or support to implement them, and the very poorest countries are those with least capacity to respond to them. The UN Task Team on the Post-2015 process criticise this structural problem for confusing the issue of partnership, and a misplaced faith in the ability of all poor countries to respond to targets equally.⁶³

Think About the Politics

The post-2015 process may avoid the current framework’s mistakes, but without learning the wider lesson about getting the politics right. Three critical issues need to be addressed by the new framework, but tackled badly could result in serious communication issues for such a process. The first two are articulated by a donor (we cite the Netherlands government’s framework) and the third by developing nations (we cite the Johannesburg Statement that came out of the 2011 Global Poverty Summit.)

1. Global Public Goods (GPGs) need to be developed that are shared and available to all nations based on the principle of ‘responsible sovereignty’.
2. Global Commons, based on the ideas of Elinor Ostrom (2009), based on the principle of a fixed group (such as a nation or grouping of nations) freely using a natural resource with deregulated ownership rights within the group, but exclusion of others outside the group.
3. Social Protection, which is a growing concern of civil society groups, the idea that development goals should aim to provide a minimum standard of living, a social floor, to all.

The lesson from the MDGs that is most overlooked is that it was a political process, not an academic one. The three issues above are fine ideas, but those agitating for them with ideological or tactical blinkers ignore a key lesson: rich nations have to agree to pay for them, and poor nations can’t see them as an attempt to limit growth. The idea of basic guaranteed development, paid for by rich countries either by cash transfer or systemic change, without a perceived commensurate exchange from poor countries in terms of market access or democracy, is unlikely to receive the broad support the MDGs did. The communique of

⁶² Leo and Barmeier 2010: pp.2

⁶³ UN System Task-Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda 2012: pp.5

the Global Poverty Summit begins by stating that “The United Nations exists to bring about a safer world and a better life for all.”⁶⁴ The first part is certainly true, but the second part seems to be mission-creep, and it is not known whether *all* member states feel that way. (How would it even do it? The UN’s budget is \$2.5bn, of which \$1.5bn is ring-fenced for peacekeeping operations. A few agencies, such as UNAIDS, fundraise separately, but \$2.5bn is roughly half the budget of the Greater London Authority – how much social protection could it actually do?)

The MDGs are a political project, and this shaped the process leading to their creation. This will be no less true for the SDGs. The context, the political environment, and economic conditions all defined the framework.⁶⁵ It is also important not to under-estimate the ‘small-p’ politics of how international diplomacy works: time-limited conferences produce pressured, tired and hungry diplomats, deals are made in side meetings as well as on the conference floor, and everybody wants to be associated with success and avoid being associated with failure.⁶⁶

A particular political ‘issue’ to consider is the role and legitimacy of the UN itself in post-2015 development frameworks. It is easy to assume that the UN will retain ‘ownership’ of any new framework, but that is not necessarily a given. A major systemic weakness of the Goals, noted by the Millennium Campaign itself⁶⁷, has been the difficulty in coordinating MDG messages across the UN system, particularly as the Campaign does not have an appreciable slice of the UN budget with which to distribute favours or twist arms. Each ‘Goal’ is owned by a particular sponsoring agency such as UNDP or UNICEF, but this only magnifies the difficulties of coordinating work that cuts across Goals or require the sharing of funds. It is notable that in the UN’s own internal planning for the post-2015 framework, the Millennium Campaign has been asked to lead on just the outreach, reflecting the networks they have with national committees, rather than on the wider process.

It is important not to write the UN off entirely though. No other body can command similar global legitimacy, and none has the legal or moral standing to effectively challenge it. In the formulation of the Goals it was the poor countries that were initially sceptical of the process, rather than the donors, and the UN’s support was critical and decisive. The UN’s role is all the more important in a world where multilateralism is becoming more difficult, with the brief consensual interlude after the end of the Cold War now giving way to a more multipolar world with several new ‘poles’ now straddling the divide between the rich world and the poor. Vandemoortele points to troubled multilateral agreement processes in recent years including Copenhagen COP15 (2009), Commercial Whaling (Agadir 2010) and world trade (Doha Round) as auguries of what is to come.⁶⁸ The idea that the UN can be bypassed entirely is inconceivable.

Think about the Environment

The lesson that multilateralism generally, and the UN specifically, are still vital for development is good news for the post-2015 project. Governance remains the critical issue that determines whether change occurs. This section argues that the environment needs to be given a starring role in post-2015 frameworks, but the global environmental movement needs to get its act together politically if it is to fulfil its objectives (we are agnostic on the specific question of whether the SDGs are the best format, which seems to be the only reasonable position until the High Level Panel reports).

The environmental and development movements, if either can be so called, are not necessarily aligned. Development activists, and particularly activists from the south, are wary of any schemes to limit growth,

⁶⁴ Johannesburg Statement on MDGs (Global Poverty Summit) 2011; accessed at: http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/events/Statement_on_MDGs.pdf

⁶⁵ Vandemoortele details this 2012a: pp.2

⁶⁶ Ibid. In a break with diplomatic niceties, Vandemoortele directly disputes Mark Malloch-Brown’s (in 2001 Chief of Staff to Kofi Annan, later administrator of UNDP and British Minister for Africa) suggestion that the MDGs were largely formulated by the Secretary-General’s office.

⁶⁷ United Nations Millennium Campaign Annual Report 2011: pp.7

Accessed at: <https://www.box.com/s/6i50wqbqo7zj9ols9wbr>

⁶⁸ Vandemoortele 2012b

especially schemes that propose that the competitive advantages that poorer countries have such as under-exploited natural resources or cheaper labour should be constrained. They see countries that have succeeded such as South Korea or Argentina and note their ruthless undercutting of developed competitors in order to break the poverty trap. They recognise the dangers of climate change and resource depletion, and this spurs them on to complete the development project before it is too late. Some feel resentful of environmentalism creeping on to their territory and are frustrated by the soft liberal paternalism that says that development agencies should be against all bad things, no matter how loosely related or even irreconcilable they may be. Adding environmentalism to the mix may just dilute the core message further, and make hard won gains even harder to maintain.

Claire Melamed, Andrew Scott and Tom Mitchell, in a paper for the Overseas Development Institute, note that the development and environment communities inhabit quite separate ‘problem spaces’ and these differences cannot be glossed over if a post-2015 framework is to adequately accommodate both.⁶⁹ Three key differences emerge between the communities: i. Development is normative, focusing on the agent, whereas environmentalism is empirical, focusing on the system.ii. Development focuses on existing problems of people now, environmentalism focuses on future or theoretical problems.iii. Development considers problems of production to be paramount, whereas environmentalism considers these to be problems of consumption.

The environmental community can learn a few lessons from the development community’s successes and mistakes. The Jubilee 2000 debt campaign successfully tied an issue of social justice to a political opportunity by framing debt-forgiveness as a way to break the cycle of under-development in the poorest nations, and as a pragmatic way to reduce aid dependency. By lobbying on one specific policy issue, the granting of Highly-Indebted Poor Country status by the World Bank and IMF to nations that pledged to invest in infrastructure and reform their governance, \$100bn of long-term (and ultimately unpayable) debt was written off at the start of a decade that saw broad-based growth in emerging economies⁷⁰. Seizing opportunities, making compromises, and (politically) getting your hands dirty has meant that long-term debt (which is only briefly addressed in the MDGs) is not the same urgent priority it seemed just a decade ago.

Another important lesson that can be taken is from the largely successful (in strictly advocacy terms) worldwide fight against HIV/AIDS. As detailed previously, HIV/AIDS experienced a political and moral ‘moment’ in the early-1980s when the enormous consequences of the disease in rich nations coincided with massive reforms in terms of gay rights and gender equality, and ready-made, activist communities kept the issue on politicians’ agendas and on the front pages of newspapers.⁷¹ Striking while the iron is hot, and recognising a political opportunity even during (or because of) tragedy should resonate with environmental activists.

In terms of fundraising, HIV/AIDS went on to become one of the most successful issues the development community has responded to. A further lesson is that for all of the resentment felt by those outside of the AIDS community (particularly by those advocating for other health issues) the rising tide of a single emotive issue can lift all boats. The sums of money raised such as by the Gates Foundation and the Global Fund, or the advocacy victories won by groups such as the Clinton Foundation or the Open Society Foundations, have contributed to raising the profile of (and cash for) more marginal issues such as Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs) or the need for general health-system and infrastructural strengthening in order to increase the effectiveness of aid.

A Case for *Unsustainable* Development Goals?

⁶⁹ Melamed, Scott and Mitchell 2012: pp.2

⁷⁰ ‘Jubilee 2000’ http://advocacyinternational.co.uk/?page_id=2585

⁷¹ Peter Baldwin details the incredibly powerful new lobbying power of these groups in *Disease and Democracy* 2008

A common metaphor for a developing country is that of a rocket trying to leave earth's atmosphere. At lift-off, the rocket travels vertically as this is the most efficient way to gain altitude and minimise drag. Then, as the rocket picks up speed and altitude it changes trajectory into a curve to take advantage of the push of the Earth's rotation. Eventually it is travelling almost horizontally, and has to accelerate to orbital velocity in order to escape gravity completely.

Just like the rocket, a developing country can't travel straight upwards indefinitely, growing only through the availability of under-exploited resources and cheap labour. It has to change its trajectory, adopting protectionist measures, aggressively subsidising exports, and promoting a secondary manufacturing base. Finally, in order to be invited to the top table, it is the quality of growth and not the amount of it that matters. An effective tax base, reinvested in infrastructure and a consumer base in the form of social protection, becomes the guarantor of long-term economic development.

Sustainable development goals face the economic reality that most countries develop most of the time in unsustainable ways. Early Developing Countries had the advantage of seemingly limitless resources (especially given colonial expansion), and Late Developing Countries explicitly chose unsustainable paths to development as these were the ones that gave them a competitive advantage over the rich. It is this quandary, squaring the aspirations of the poor with the available resources left, which will be the defining feature of development in subsequent decades.

An inherent weakness in the sustainability agenda is that not only is uncertainty hard to manage in its own right, but it seems to be a consistently difficult (and unpopular) message to sell. As the Millennium Campaign itself shows, high food and fuel prices and recession have hurt some vulnerable populations, but reductions in global poverty and hunger have remained robust, reaching the goal by 2010 rather than 2015. The global extreme poverty rate stands at one billion, about 16% of world population, of whom 80% are in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, but the two-three billion on lower-middle incomes, including massive numbers in 'extremely poor' states outweighs this.⁷² At a time when environmental crisis and financial crisis should be provoking systemic collapse (in the minds of some of those in the environmental movement) the very worst advertisement for sustainable development goals is considerable numbers of people in poor countries starting to become comfortable, and a small number becoming filthy rich. Successful development goals become victims of their own success, and merely repeating the exercise (or giving the impression of repeating it) detracts from their practical and moral force.

The United Nations' post-2015 plan interestingly describes what it is aiming for as 'transformative change.' This is important on both a political and semantic level, as it is a change from 'sustainable' development, possibly even an irreconcilable one (although it should be noted the document does also use the phrase 'sustainable development' too without precisely defining either.) Sustainable development is not the same thing as development that emphasises sustainability. The development strategy that seems to work (or at least that poor countries mostly adopt) is that of explicitly unsustainable development, development that pays less attention to environmental and human system improvement as it does to growth, in the hope that double-digit economic expansion will force the sort of efficiencies necessary, such as adequate competition and effective rules, in order to give poorer nations a long-term advantage against their richer competitors. It is no coincidence, of course, that rapid economic expansion is often favoured by political leaders where democratic accountability is also a developmental project.

The next development framework will need to recognise that the world has changed. Not only are issues of sustainability more important than ever, but distinct categories of rich and poor no longer work. Some of the richest countries contain a lot of the poorest people. Some of the poorest countries contain some of the richest people. Frameworks built on the idea of money flowing one way and consent flowing the other, are outdated. This paper has highlighted significant gaps between development and sustainability agendas. For a new international framework to succeed in promoting development and averting environmental collapse, urgent attention needs to be given to defining common ground and then working to expand the size of the constituency that occupies it.

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⁷²The Millennium Development Goals Report 2012: pp.7

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Appendix A: Millennium Development Goal Progress Map

Target	Indicator	Global Status	Progress (Best Indicator)	Regional Progress to Targets (Source: UN MDGs Report 2012)									Potential Successor Based on Rio+20 Communique		Source	Link	
				N Africa	SS Africa	E Asia	SE Asia	S Asia	W Asia	Oceania	LAC	CCA	Potential Successor to Target	Potential Successor to Indicator			
Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Hunger and Poverty																	
Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day	1.1 Proportion of population below \$1 (PPP) per day	On-Target. New measure of those living on less than \$1.25/day reduced from 47% in 1990 to 24% in 2008 - 600m people. However, much of this due to improvements in China, Middle East and India. 59/106 countries do not satisfy basic statistical requirements.												NA	NA	United Nations Development Group	http://www.devinfo.info/mdginfo2011/
	1.2 Poverty gap ratio	On-Target. Related to 1.1. But notable lack of data to compare 1990 values with 2010 values												NA	NA	World Bank	http://www.app.collinsindicate.com/mdg/en-us
	1.3 Share of poorest quintile in national consumption	On-Target. Related to 1.1. But notable lack of data to compare 1990 values with 2010 values												NA	NA	World Bank	http://www.app.collinsindicate.com/mdg/en-us
Target 1.B: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including	1.4 Growth rate of GDP per person employed	Insufficient data. LDCs 3.1% 2010. Does not do comparable multi-year studies.												5.154 Increased employment can be secured through investments in technological innovation, public works to restore	2.38 UN Statistical Division to work on adopting broader measures of progress towards development goals to complement	United Nations Development Group	http://www.devinfo.info/

women and young people	1.5 Employment-to-population ratio	On-Target. Slight decrease in overall employment - 62.2% in 1990, 60.3% - maybe due to Recession. Massive growth in China, SE Asia and Latin America. Better data in LDCs									and protect natural resources and ecosystems	GDP	World Bank	http://www.app.collinsindicate.com/mdg/en-us
	1.6 Proportion of employed people living below \$1 (PPP) per day	Insufficient Data. Disappointing stats, given how well proportion living below \$1.25 are collected. No aggregate global stats. Best collected in South America, Europe, which if anything show increases in %											World Bank	http://www.app.collinsindicate.com/mdg/en-us
	1.7 Proportion of own-account and contributing family workers in total employment	On-Target. Decrease in aggregate numbers from 55% to 50% overall; perhaps better than predicted. Slight recent dent due to financial crisis.											2.24 A global strategy on youth and employment should be developed with the ILO	United Nations Development Group
Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger	1.8 Prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age	Insufficient Data. Decrease from 24.5% in 2000 to 21.4% in 2009. Particularly inconsistent data collection year by year and country by country.									"1.2 Free humanity from hunger and poverty 5.108 Commitment to food security in line with Rome Principles 2009		World Bank	http://www.app.collinsindicate.com/mdg/en-us
	1.9 Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption	Target Missed. Slow reduction of food insecurity from 16% in 1992 to 14% in 2001 and 13% in 2008. Food insecurity concentrated in Central Africa, the Sahel and South Asia - typically above 20% each.									5.110. Increase sustainable agricultural production 5.111 Enhance systems for food security. 5.114 Commitment to better agricultural research 5.116 Address the structural causes of price volatility 5.117 Improved market information systems		World Bank	http://www.app.collinsindicate.com/mdg/en-us

												5.168 Meet the requirements of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation to increase fish stocks				
												5.169 Meet the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries "				
Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education																
Target 2.A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling	2.1 Net enrolment ratio in primary education	Off-Target. Shows some improvement from 84% 2001 to 88% 2005 and to 90% 2009 but unlikely to reach parity by 2015											5.229 Commitment to the right to education and gender equality within		World Bank	http://www.app.collinsindicate.com/mdg/en-us
	2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary	Off-Target. Some improvement - 84% 2001, 84% 2005, 88% 2009 but massive gaps in data and disparities - mostly in Middle-Income countries rather than LDCs													World Bank	http://www.app.collinsindicate.com/mdg/en-us
	2.3 Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, women and men	On-Target. General improvement of female literacy ratios is positive sign for overall target: 79% in 1990, 84% in 2000, 87% in 2009														World Bank
Goal 3: Achieve Universal Primary Education																
Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015	3.1 Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education	On-Target. Gender disparity at 97% in 2010, within the 3% margin of error allowed											"5.241 Implement Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development"		United Nations Development Group	http://www.devinfo.info/mdginfo2011/
	3.2 Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector	Off-Target. Progress in some MICs. 35% in 1990, 37.5% in 2000, 38.4% in 2005, 39.6% in 2009, 41% 2015 (proj.)													United Nations Development Group	http://www.devinfo.info/DIWizard/DIWizardPreviews.aspx
	3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament	Insufficient Data. No aggregated historical trend data. 19.3% in 2011 only suggests moderate														United Nations Development Group

		progress, but rough parity only reached in a few Scandinavian [ie Denmark] and African [ie Rwanda] outliers											
Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality													
Target 4.A: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate	4.1 Under-five mortality rate /1,000	On-Target. Good progress has been made against an ambitious target, and it is close to being achieved by 2015. 71.70 in 1990, 56.50 in 2000, 41.09 in 2010											United Nations Statistics Division http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=561
	4.2 Infant mortality rate / 1,000	Off-Target. Progress has been made globally, 58 in 1990, 52 in 1995, 46 in 2000, 41 in 2010. But incredible variation still - Sierra Leone 114 (2010) Ghana 50 (2010) Brazil 17 (2010) Sweden 2 (2010)											World Bank http://www.app.collinsindicate.com/mdg/en-us
	4.3 Proportion of 1 year-old children immunised against measles	Target Missed. Low progress against baseline, given the universal goal. 73% in 1990, 74% in 1995, 73% in 2000, 78% in 2005, 85% 2010 Very low levels in SSA and Indian Sub-Continent. Levels also fell in Europe and N America at turn of century - a sign of faltering campaigns and complacency?											World Bank http://www.app.collinsindicate.com/mdg/en-us
Goal 5: Improve Maternal Health													
Target 5.A: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the	5.1 Maternal mortality ratio	Target Missed. Data is very poorly collated and aggregated, particularly still in SSA. Demonstrates importance of M+M											5.146 Commitment to reduce maternal and neonate mortality World Bank http://www.app.collinsindicate.com/mdg/en-us

spread of HIV/AIDS		very large regional variations - above 35% in certain Southern African nations around 2000 - with much lower results, or even uncollected results in the Middle East and Asia. Additionally, significant statistical improvement may account for at least some of the downward revisions in late 2000s. 0.3% 1990, 0.8% 1995, 1.0% 2000, 1.0% 2005, 0.8% 2009							are continuing threat; and commitment to universal access to HIV treatment and to eliminated MTCT of HIV				
	6.2 Condom use at last high-risk sex	Insufficient Data. Disappointingly unaggregated given the overall quality of AIDS data. UN undertook a survey of 43 LDCs and MDCs between 2005 and 2009 with typically only one data point per country. Very wide distribution from 22% (Liberia 2007) to 90% (Swaziland 2010)							5.142 Affirm right to use TRIPs, Doha round etc in order to produce health for all		United Nations Statistics Division	http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=734	
	6.3 Proportion of population aged 15-24 years with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS	Insufficient Data. Disappointingly unaggregated given the overall quality of AIDS data.											http://www.app.collinsindicate.com/mdg/en-us
	6.4 Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14 years	On-Target (But Unaggregated). This indicator does not meet the standard of publicly-available aggregated data. However, according to UNAIDS 2011 Global AIDS Report: "[r]ecent progress has been remarkable. In some countries in which survey-based trend data are available, the level of school attendance among children aged 10 to 14										United Nations Statistics Division/UNAI DS	http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2011/1-31339%20(E)%20MDG%20Report%202011_Book%20LR.pdf

		who have been orphaned has increased to near parity with that of other children." pp.40												
Target 6.B: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all who need it	6.5 Proportion of population with advanced HIV infection with access to antiretroviral drugs	Off-Target. Target has been missed, but this masks the global success of the '3x5' initiative of 2002-2005. Coverage at 47% Dec 2010 (14.2m), although this does not specify the clinical definition of advanced infections (usually interpreted as a CD4 count of <200), and the 47% covers all access.											UNAIDS	http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/2011/20111130-UA_Report_en.pdf
Target 6.C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases	6.6 Incidence and death rates associated with malaria	On-Target. Malaria showed only a 3% reduction worldwide between 2000 and 2010 with 216m cases in 2010; with 81% of cases in Africa and 600k deaths - the majority in infants. Due to 4 factors - i. P.falciparum (the deadliest sub-type) accounts for 98% of cases in Africa; ii. Environmental factors (standing water) have not been addressed; iii. low reporting rates of malaria of 11% - a lack of money in surveillance; iv. Artemisinin-resistance spreading.											WHO	http://www.who.int/malaria/world_malaria_report_2011/9789241564403_eng.pdf
	6.7 Proportion of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-treated bednets	Insufficient Data. WHO uses baseline household surveys in selected countries as representative for whole regions - Zimbabwe is used for SSA not including Somalia, and registers at 7%. Shows need for better surveillance coverage.											WHO	http://www.who.int/malaria/world_malaria_report_2011/9789241564403_eng.pdf
	6.8 Proportion of	Insufficient Data. Not											United Nations	http://www.devinfo.info/

	<p>children under 5 with fever who are treated with appropriate anti-malarial drugs</p>	<p>available in 2011 Global Malaria Report; no aggregated or continental data; data only available from 38 LDCs worldwide. Typical result is Zambia 34%, 2010.</p>													<p>Development Group</p>	
	<p>6.9 Incidence, prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis</p>	<p>Off-Target. TB targets have largely been thwarted by the development of multiple (MDR-TB) and extensive (XDR-TB) drug resistant strains, and HIV/TB coinfections in SSA. <u>Death Rates:</u> 30/100k 1990, 26/100k 2000, 20/100k 2009 <u>Just SSA:</u> 32/100,000 1990 54/100,000 2000 53/100,000 2009 <u>Incidence:</u> 128/100k 1990, 136/100,000 2000, 128/100k 1990 <u>Just SSA:</u> 176/100k 1990, 316/100k 2000, 345/100k 2009 <u>Prevalence:</u> 1990 253/100k, 2000 231/100k, 2009 201/100k <u>Just SSA:</u> 1990 287/100k, 2000 456/100k, 2009 479/100k</p>													<p>United Nations Development Group</p>	<p>http://www.devinfo.info/</p>
	<p>6.10 Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed treatment short course</p>	<p>Target Missed. This programme to enhance surveillance and diagnosis of TB has largely failed, contributing to the failure to reduce the burden of TB <u>Detection</u> World: 1990 55%, 2000 45%, 2009 62% SSA: 1990 45%, 2000 38%, 2009 48% <u>Cured</u> World: 2000 69% SSA 2000 71%"</p>													<p>United Nations Development Group</p>	<p>http://www.devinfo.info/</p>

Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability											
Target 7.A: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources	7.1 Proportion of land area covered by forest	Off-Target. This indicator barely shows signs of slowing, let alone reversing, and may not count as 'orange' in an independent analysis. 1990 - 32%, 2000 - 31.4%, 2010 - 31%						"5.193 Further action on the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests (NLBI) 5.194 United States Forum on Forests to take lead on this issue."	"3.58 Green economy policies in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication 3.66 The UN to lead on gathering and disseminating information on mechanisms for sustainable development 4.88 Strengthen the UNEP in order to set the global environmental agenda, including greater funding and UN impact 5.158 Seas and coasts are critical to ecosystems, and UNCLOS is the framework through which these should be protected 5.161 Support for the Regular Process for Global Reporting and Assessment of the State of the Marine Environment due to report in 2014 5.162 Commitment to developing an international instrument under UNCLOS on the issue of sustainable conservation of marine areas beyond national waters by 69th GA (2014) 5.163 Commitment to take action on pollutants in the	United Nations Development Group	http://www.devinfo.info/mdginfo2011/
	7.2 CO2 emissions, total, per capita and per \$1 GDP (PPP)	Insufficient Data. Shows an increase b1990-2000 and no aggregated data after this.							United Nations Development Group	http://www.devinfo.info/mdginfo2011/	
	7.3 Consumption of ozone-depleting substances	Insufficient Data. No global aggregated data. However, significant falls have been demonstrated in very different areas, indicating that this target has been met. All figures in metric tonnes per person: <u>Japan</u> 1990: 12074, 2000: 5982, 2010: 622.4 <u>Argentina</u> 1990: 1514, 2000: 3383, 2010:781 <u>Myanmar</u> 1990: 16.6, 2000: 26.6, 2010: 4.5 <u>Benin</u> 1990: 60.8, 2000: 55.2, 2010: 24.2							United Nations Statistics Division	http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srId=753	
	7.4 Proportion of fish stocks within safe biological limits	Off-Target. Needs to do better from a low base. Data is also poorly collected. 2000: Depleted 21.3% / Over Exploited 17.7% / Recovering 1.1% 2010: Depleted 7.4% / Fully Exploited 50% / Moderately Exploited 22.3% / Over Exploited 8.5% / Recovering 2.7%"							United Nations Development Group	http://www.devinfo.info/mdginfo2011/	

Appendix B: Potential Goals, Targets and Indicators of SDGs		
Source: Rio+20 Outcome Document		
BOLD: Specific issue carrying over from a commitment in the MDGs UNBOLD: Specific issue not raised in the MDGs		
Section	Commitment	Issue of Concern
1. Our Common Vision		
	1.2 Commitment to '...free humanity from poverty and hunger as a matter of urgency.'	
		1.3 Need to focus on economic, social and environmental linkages of sustainable development
		"1.4 Aims of development are poverty eradication, ending unsustainability and protecting natural resource base (the 'Three Aims')"
2. Renewing Political Commitment		
	2.19 Close 'development gaps between developed and developing countries'	
		2.20 The Three Dimensions of post-1992 failure - integration, implementation and coherence - need to be central to the sustainable development process
		2.21 Population growth and urbanisation pose major persistent challenges to development, food production and health
	2.24 A global strategy on youth and employment should be developed with the ILO	
		2.24 Employment needs to be put at the heart of development thinking
		2.25 Urgent action needed on climate change
		2.32 The unique challenges of the most vulnerable countries, particularly in Africa, landlocked developing and small island developing states, states in conflict, need to be addressed
		2.35 No new commitments on Africa, but rather need to implement existing ones, particularly the Millennium Declaration, NEPAD, Monterrey Consensus, Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, 2008 Political Declaration on Africa
	2.38 UN Statistical Division to work on adopting broader measures of progress towards development goals to complement GDP	
		"2.44 Civil society needs to be central to sustainable development. IT needs to be central to sustainable development too"
3. Green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication		
		3. 56. The green economy is one of the major tools to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication.

	<p>"3.58. Green economy policies in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication should:</p> <p>(a) be consistent with international law;</p> <p>(b) respect each country's national sovereignty over their natural resources;</p> <p>(c) be supported by an enabling environment and well-functioning institutions at all levels;</p> <p>(d) promote sustained and inclusive economic growth, and respect of all human rights;</p> <p>(e) take into account the needs of developing countries, particularly those in special situations;</p> <p>(f) strengthen international cooperation, including the provision of financial resources, capacity building and technology transfer;</p> <p>(g) effectively avoid unwarranted conditionalities on ODA and finance;</p> <p>(h) not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination on international trade,</p> <p>(i) contribute to closing technology gaps between developed and developing countries</p> <p>(j) enhance the welfare of indigenous peoples and their communities,</p> <p>(k) enhance the welfare of women, children, youth, persons with disabilities, smallholder and subsistence farmers, fishers and those working in small and medium enterprises,</p> <p>(l) mobilize the full potential and ensure equal contribution of both women and men;</p> <p>(m) promote productive activities in developing countries that contribute to the eradication of poverty;</p> <p>(n) address the concern about inequalities and promote social inclusion, including social protection floors;</p> <p>(o) promote sustainable consumption and production patterns; and</p> <p>(p) continue efforts to strive for inclusive, equitable development approaches to overcome poverty and inequality.</p>	
		3.62 Implementation of green economy policies necessary for sustainable development and poverty eradication
	<p>3.66 The UN, with donors and international organisations, should gather information on:</p> <p>(a) matching interested countries with the partners best suited to provide requested support;</p> <p>(b) toolboxes and/or best practices in applying policies on green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication at all levels;</p> <p>(c) models or good examples of policies of green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication;</p> <p>(d) methodologies for evaluation of policies of green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication;</p> <p>(e) existing and emerging platforms that contribute in this regard.</p>	
4. An Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development		
		4.75 A strengthened institutional framework for sustainable development
	4.84 Establish an intergovernmental High-Level Forum to build upon the work of the Commission for Sustainable Development	
	4.88 Strengthen the UNEP in order to set the global environmental agenda, including greater funding and UN impact	
	4.94 Wider UN system invited to integrate social, economic and environmental dimensions of sustainable development into their operational activities	

5. Framework for Action		
5.1 Poverty Eradication		
		5.105 Progress on MDGS has been uneven, and divergence between some nations and others is at least as worrying as not achieving overall goals
		5.106 Post-2015 task is to create an enabling environment to 'expand development opportunities'
		5.107 Emphasis on social protection systems essential for eradicating poverty and building on MDGs
	5.108 Commitment to food security and access to adequate, safe and nutritious food in line with Rome Principles 2009	
		5.109 Revitalising rural communities as an important part of promoting economic development in the poorest countries
	5.110. Increase sustainable agricultural production and productivity by investing in sustainable agriculture, land management and rural development.	
	5.111 Enhance systems for more sustainable agriculture including crops, livestock, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture that is economically viable and increases food security.	
		5.112 There is a need for sustainable livestock systems focusing on health and livelihoods
		5.113 Healthy marine ecosystems necessary for food security
	5.114 Commitment to better agricultural research, extension services and training	
	5.116 Address the structural causes of price volatility in food markets	
	5.117 Address price volatility through improved market information systems	
		5.119 Water and sanitation has to be central to food system improvement and development
	5.120 Build on MDGs related to access to safe water and sanitation	
	5.121 Establish and promote a Human Right to clean water	
	5.122 Better management of ecosystems for water security	
	5.123 Coordinated water stock management to prevent drought and flood	
	5.124 Tackle water pollution, treatment and efficiency	
Energy		
		5.126 Energy production is critical to development, social inclusion and gender equality
		5.127 Sustainable and efficient use of energy to be promoted (but no specifics!)
		5.128 Energy efficiency important to development and climate change
Sustainable Tourism		
		5.130 Sustainable development is key to

		sustainable tourism
	5.131 Access to credit and microcredit for SMEs critical to this sector	
Sustainable Transport		
		5.132 Transport and mobility is essential to sustainable development. Sustainable transport respects the environment, promotes economic growth, and fosters accessibility.
		5.133 Sustainable transport systems must focus on multi-modal systems, clean vehicles and mass transport
Sustainable Cities and Human Settlements		
		5.134 Holistic approaches needed to city planning focusing on slum improvement and regeneration
		5.135 Sustainable development policies need to be planned on a civic level
		5.136 Sustainable development planning needs to account for increasing urban populations through the 21C
Health and Population		
		5.138 Health is a precondition for, outcome of, and indicator of sustainable development
	5.139 Work towards the provision of universal health coverage	
	5.140 HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB, influenza, polio, and communicable diseases are continuing threat; and commitment to universal access to HIV treatment and to eliminated MTCT of HIV	
		5.141 NCDs are a particular threat and need health system strengthening to address
	5.142 Affirm right to use TRIPs, Doha round etc in order to produce health for all	
		5.143 Health system strengthening should become a core component of health financing
Promoting full and productive employment, decent work for all, and social protections		
	5.146 Commitment to reduce maternal and neonate mortality	
		5.147 Poverty eradication and full employment are related
		5.151 Gender balance is needed in employment
		5.153 Social protection for and a recognition of unpaid work
	5.154 Increased employment can be secured through investments in technological innovation, public works to restore and protect natural resources and ecosystems	
		5.156 Social protection necessary for growth, resilience, social justice and coherence
Oceans and seas		
	5.158 Seas and coasts are critical to ecosystems, and UNCLOS is the framework through which these should be protected	
		5.160 Need to build capacity of developing states to utilise and protect their coastal zones and the high seas
	5.161 Support for the Regular Process	

	for Global Reporting and Assessment of the State of the Marine Environment due to report in 2014	
	5.162 Commitment to developing an international instrument under UNCLOS on the issue of sustainable conservation of marine areas beyond national waters by 69th GA (2014)	
	5.163 Commitment to take action on pollutants in the seas including plastic, perssistent organic compounds, heavy metals and nitrogen-based compounds, significant reductions in marine debris by 2025.	
		5.164 Management of alien invasive species
		5.165 Address challenges of sea level rise on coastal communities
		5.166 Take action on Ocean Acidization
		5.167 Take action on Ocean fertilisation
	5.168 Meet the requirements of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation to increase fish stocks to sustainable levels by 2012	
	5.169 Meet the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of UNCLOS relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the FAO International Plans of Action	
		5.170 Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing
		5.172 Promote accountability and transparency by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations
		5.174 Assist LDCs and Small-Island states to sustainably conserve and manage fish production
	5.177 Meet 10th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity commitment to 10% of areas important to biodiversity to be protected and conserved	
		5.178 SIDS are of unique importance to development because of their particular vulnerabilities including remoteness, access to markets, narrow resource base and environmental challenges, as well as general lack of progress on many development indicators
Small Island Developing States		
	5.179 Implement the Barbados Programme of Action and Mauritius Strategy for Implementation concerning SIDS	
	5.181 Agree to implement Istanbul Programme of Action on LDCs to 2020	
	5.182 Agree to implement Almaty Programme of Action on LLLDC	
		5.183 Development cooperation needs to continue, facilitated by technology transfer
	5.184 Fulfil commitments to sustainable growth under NEPAD	
		5.185 Support regional mechanisms good for

		sustainable development
Disaster Risk Reduction		
	5.186 Implement the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters	
	5.187 Early Warning Systems should be integrated as part of a risk reduction strategy integrated into national planning strategies, particularly integrating with climate change planning.	
Climate Change		
		5.190 Climate change as one of most significant risks facing development. 'In this regard we emphasize that adaptation to climate change represents an immediate and urgent global priority.'
Forests		
	5.193 Further action on the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests (NLBI)	
	5.194 United States Forum on Forests to take lead on this issue.	
Biodiversity		
		5.197 Biodiversity essential to ecosystem preservation and human systems
	5.198 Implement Convention on Biodiversity, Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 Aichi Biodiversity Targets, Nagoya Protocol	
		5.201 Mainstream socioeconomic benefits of conservation of ecological systems
	5.202 Convention on International Trade in	
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora in regulating trade and development."		
		5.205 Importance of good land management, particularly soil management to development and health; major challenges in LDCs
	5.207 Strengthen United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) to take coordinated action nationally, regionally and internationally, to monitor, globally, land degradation and restore degraded lands in arid, semi-arid and dry sub humid areas.	
		5.209 States to share and cooperate in the establishment and maintenance of EWS's
Mountains		
		5.210 Mountain ecosystems critical to watershed management, and particularly vulnerable to climate changedeforestation and land degradation
Chemicals and waste		
	5.214 Strengthen the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM)	
	"5.216 Fully implement the Basel Convention, the Rotterdam Convention and the Stockholm Convention	
		5.218 Greater emphasis on 3Rs - reduce, reuse, recycle - and management of solid wastes, particularly chemicals and heavy metals

	5.221 A binding international agreement is needed on mercury	
		5.222 Reduction of CFCs has led to a rise of global warming increasing HFCs (hydrofluorocarbons)
Sustainable consumption and production		
	5.224 Implement the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 and the JPOI on sustainable consumption	
	5.225 A general commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies	
	5.226 10-Year Framework of Programmes (10YFP) on sustainable consumption and production (SCP). Invite GA to invite a state to oversee implementation of this	
Mining		
		5.227 Recognition of mining as essential to development especially for LDCs, especially under Rio frameworks
		5.228 Recognise importance of strong and effective legal and regulatory frameworks for the mining sector
Education		
	5.229 Commitment to the right to education and gender equality within	
		5.230 Integrate youth into the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development
		5.235 Promote research and innovation for sustainable development at universities and places of learning
Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment		
		5.236 Womens role and leadership in development crucial
		5.237 Lack of progress on certain gender-based socio-economic inequalities should be addressed
		5.240 Commitment to women's full participation in economy
	5.241 Implement Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development	
		5.245 "We underscore that the MDGs are a useful tool in focusing achievement of specific development gains as part of a broad development vision ..."
		5.246 "...We further recognize the importance and utility of a set of sustainable development goals (SDGs), which are based on Agenda 21 and Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, fully respect all Rio Principles, taking into account different national circumstances, capacities and priorities, are consistent with international law, build upon commitments already made, and contribute to the full implementation of the outcomes of all major Summits in the economic, social and environmental fields, including this outcome document."
		5.247 "...We also underscore that SDGs should be action-oriented, concise and easy to communicate, limited in number, aspirational, global in nature and universally applicable to all countries while taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies

		and priorities."
		5.248. Intergovernmental panel to be established on the SDG agenda by the 67th session of the UNGA.
Finance		
		6.253 Effective financing of post-2015 framework needed.
	6.255 Intergovernmental process should be set up to assess financing needs, synergies of existing protocols in order to develop a sustainable development financing initiative	
	6.256 Recommitment to meet the 0.7% GDP to ODA target	
		6.259 Need to increase quality of ODA (but no real ideas on this)
		6.260 Need to embrace changed aid architecture of last 10 years
		6.262 Greater coherence needed between funding mechanisms
		6.263 Economic crisis is a threat to development initiatives
		6.264 Reform of Global Environmental Facility to additional steps within its mandate to make resources more accessible to meet country needs for the national implementation of their international environmental commitments.
		6.266 Need to fight corruption and illegal financial flows
		6.269 Importance of technology flows to developing countries
		6.271 Environments for the dissemination of environmentally sound technologies
		6.277 Enhanced capacity building for sustainable development. Implementation of Bali Strategic Plan
		6.282 Meet Doha commitments
	6.283 Secretary General to oversee registry of commitment through 2012 post-MDGs processes	